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Introduction
By Professor Charlie Beckett, Director, Polis, LSE 
The political transition in Egypt might be considered the most complex and 
fast moving of the Arab post-revolution political processes. The January 25 
Revolution (2011), lead to the removal of Hosni Mubarak from the presi-
dency. Further large popular protests followed just two years later (30 June 
2013), this time ousting the first democratically elected president since 
Mubarak. The Muslim Brotherhood government led by Mohamed Morsi 
was overthrown in a popularly backed military coup (3 July 2013). The coup 
was portrayed as a national rescue operation from the rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, perceived by many as highly inept at governing Egypt. For 
supporters of the Brotherhood, the military coup symbolises a counter-revo-
lution and a return of the old regime. [See Appendix for a detailed summary 
of the sequence of political change].
There had been hopes—partly inspired by the role of social media and plat- 
forms such as satellite television in the various uprisings—that news media in 
Egypt might become more open and play a positive role in any moves towards 
greater democracy. The mainstream media that this report deals with had 
been shackled by state influence and clientalism under Mubarak.
Yet media reform during this complex political transition was slow, stalled 
by brutal political struggles. While topics such as media professionalism, fair- 
ness in the presentation of opposing viewpoints and media regulatory reform 
were often highly present in political debates, this did not lead to substantial 
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change. The blurred line between journalism and activism along with the 
excessive political alignment of media further contributed to a stalled reform 
process. The media “revolution” is yet to be launched.
Based on extensive recent interviews with participants in mainstream media 
in Egypt along with other stakeholders, this report seeks to give a picture of 
the state of Egyptian traditional mainstream media and the challenges it faces 
in these turbulent times. It does not pretend to be a comprehensive survey 
and because of the continuing upheaval, it will inevitably date. However, 
we believe the key issues and trends that it outlines will remain significant 
and that urgent attention must be given to them by anyone interested in a 
healthier news media in Egypt.
The paper sets out some of the historical background and much of the regu-
latory and legislative context, too. However, by using the contents guide you 
can skip those more technical passages if you wish and get to the extraor-
dinary and complex battle for editorial ethics and political power over the 
media, waged by all sides in this difficult and dangerous time for Egypt. There 
is also a fascinating discussion of the TV talk shows and their ‘political clubs’ 
that are both popularising and distorting political discourse at this critical 
time.
This report was carried out in the heat of battle and the war between state 
and free journalism in Egypt continues. In a sense, this paper is an act of 
journalism that seeks to inspire debate as much as inform. We welcome your 
views and hope that the debate continues.
This paper was produced with the support of the Open Society Foundation 
Polis is the international journalism think-tank in the Department of 
Media and Communications at the London School of Economics.
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Executive Summary 
and Recommendations
The Egyptian media revolution has not happened. The complexity of the 
political transition has overshadowed the debates on reforming traditional 
media. It is not possible to understand the challenges faced by the Egyptian 
traditional media post-revolution without appreciating the particularities of 
the Egyptian media industry as well as the nature of the political transition.
Egyptian journalists in traditional or mainstream media have not yet 
launched their own revolution independently from the political sphere 
and power struggle. The movement calling for reformed media practices 
and structures did not evolve into a solid and clear structure for dissecting 
media problems in-depth. Nor has it gone beyond the general calls for 
freedom of expression or the legitimate struggle for improving the working 
conditions of journalists. These debates have not developed into a process 
aiming to define professional journalism standards and how to implement 
these standards into media practices.
The rebirth of traditional Egyptian media requires a complex set of inter-
ventions on different levels, which have to go hand in hand with one 
another. Self-censorship habits are entrenched in the practices of Egyptian 
journalists, who largely perceive their role as servants of political masters. 
Even though the debate on reforming media was high on the agenda during 
the time of the revolution, this subservient perception did not change. 
Journalists were still struggling to cope with a new environment where 
they could operate without instructions. The deep political polarization 
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between pro-Islamists and pro-liberals under the Brotherhood rule trans-
formed media into the favourite platform for political spin. The newfound 
liberty was translated into a chaotic expression of unfounded views and 
rumours.
The degradation of professional skills over decades meant traditional 
media was unable to benefit from the relative media openness post-revo-
lution. Thus, it could not evolve proper investigative or critical reporting. 
The weak professional structures hampered the process of defining codes of 
ethics and professional standards, which should be implemented by the jour-
nalists themselves. The orchestration by all media platforms, state-owned 
and private alike, of a blunt propaganda in praise of the military in the 
post-Brotherhood rule questions the media’s quest for independence from 
the power.
The crude narration of a one-sided story orchestrated by a compliant 
media, echoing the new regime’s narratives, is not only hampering media 
reform but also the entire democratisation process. It is reviving the old 
media practices of demonising the political adversary and eliminating it by 
excluding it or limiting coverage to a negative reporting.
Although the internal media “revolution” is imperative for reviewing jour-
nalism practices and values, the newsrooms change will not be sufficient 
enough to provide an answer to the complex sets of problems of this large 
media industry. The liberalisation of the national media industry is solidly 
linked to a comprehensive review of the structures that govern media 
institutions. It also requires revamping the media regulatory framework by 
abrogating its many oppressive features. As rightly pointed out by a journalist 
interviewed, “I cannot operate as an independent and professional journalist as 
long as I can be arrested and imprisoned for doing my job.”
Egyptian media reform requires a complex operation involving both legal 
reform and institutional review of media practices and professional standards.
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Recommendations
A) To government and legislators 
 Implement a rigorous and comprehensive regulatory reform abolishing 
oppressive legal provisions co-opting freedom of expression, thus enabling 
an effective and responsible media freedom. Media reform requires a 
review of all legal provisions regulating media from scratch. This requires 
to abolish prison sentences for journalists in offences resulting from the 
exercise of their profession and to introduce a clear definition of redun-
dant legal provisions allowing limitations of freedom of expression such 
as the safeguard of national security. The trial of journalists before the 
military courts should be forbidden. 
 Review all structures governing traditional media and free the media 
industry from the direct management of the government in order to guar-
antee its independence. This requires a change of the state media’s institu-
tional structure from scratch, inspired by similar international experiences.
 Provide a solution for the long standing problem of inflated structures in 
state media. Although this operation will encompass unpopular measures 
such as staff cuts, this could be balanced with providing professional 
training and incentives for staff whose professional capacities have been 
seriously diminished over the decades.
 Establish independent bodies to oversee media that are explicitly inde-
pendent from the political sphere. It is imperative they have a special-
ised mandate, benefit from similar transitional experiences, and be led 
by media experts independently from government interference. These 
bodies should be tasked with monitoring media practices and drafting 
regulations. The role of these bodies should not go to the extent of direct 
interference in the editorial decision making of state media outlets.
 Draft laws that guarantee the transparency of private media ownership 
is essential, especially with the danger of misuse of these powerful media 
platforms for serving political agendas. Private media should provide 
detailed information on the source of their funding and their major finan-
cial operations.
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B) To the community of journalists 
 Extend the role of the Journalists’ Syndicate to become a platform for 
an open debate on professional practices. This should be accompanied 
by the establishment of representative structures for broadcast media. 
These professional structures will act as the backbone for the process of 
formulating editorial policies and charters.
 Launch a comprehensive internal process leading to the adoption of 
codes of conduct, formulated and implemented by journalists themselves 
with no input from the government and within a structure allowing for 
a representation of different segments of media industries. It is equally 
crucial to develop a mechanism to monitor the implementation of such 
codes.
 The political alignment of journalists is the major obstacle to the devel-
opment of free and professional media practices. The incapability and 
unwillingness of journalists to perceive their roles independently from 
the political sphere allows systematic political manipulation of media. 
Journalists need to value independent professional codes of conduct.
 To overcome self-censorship habits the underlying challenge for tradi-
tional journalists. Pluralistic media was a professional ideal defended by 
Egyptian journalists post-revolution. Under the rule of the Brotherhood 
government, media platforms witnessed a high level of diversity in views, 
including radical dissenting voices. Journalists should be more concerned 
than they are about the recent crackdown on freedoms in the name of 
security. Journalists should be much more resistant to the imposition of 
new boundaries on their coverage in the name of security.
 Journalists must draw a line between activism and journalism. Media 
activism contributed to raising journalists’ courage to approach long- 
standing taboos. However, the development of activism in the name of 
the revolution first, and lately in the name of “patriotic duty” to fight 
terrorism, is hindering the development of independent, critical reporting 
and exacerbating the use of media for political distortion and control.
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 Journalists should stand up for editorial pluralism and genuine debate. 
The role of journalists in shaping the political transition is reflected in an 
extreme polarised reporting under the Brotherhood, followed recently by 
simplistic propaganda in praise of the military. The lack of awareness by 
journalists of their responsibility in deepening the current political and 
social divisions is alarming.
C) To the community of international agencies and donors
 Capacity-building programmes should be conducted in partnership with 
internal media groups. These programmes should be adopted by journal-
ists and media institutions in order to enable their implementation.
 A review of media practices can only be an internal process with the 
support of external agents. There is a strong reluctance from the Egyptian 
media community to accept external intervention if not tailored to the 
“specific” conditions of the Egyptian media industry. Imposing external 
models will not be efficient. It is more beneficial to discuss the partic-
ular challenges of this media industry in light of similar transitional 
experiences.
 Encourage the development of professional structures entrusted with not 
only lobbying to end abuses against media but also monitoring abuses 
committed by media. These structures can play a major role in the 
defining of media values and professionalism.
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CHAPTER 1 
National Egyptian Media: 
A Coercive Regulatory Framework
Historical Background
Since independence from the United Kingdom in 1952, Egypt’s media has 
been largely state-owned. The late President Gamal Abdel Nasser nation-
alised the press (24 May 1956) thus transforming media into a tool for the 
regime controlled through different legal and administrative instruments.
The state-owned Egyptian media developed as an apparatus of print and 
broadcast organs with the main task of voicing the regime’s message and 
asserting its regional role. The state-controlled print media is comprised of six 
publishing houses. These publishing houses (al-Ahram, al-Hilal, Roz el-Youssef, 
al-Akhbar, al-Tahrir, al-Qawmiyya lil tawziee, (The National [company] for 
Distribution) produce 55 daily, weekly and monthly print publications.2 Its 
mission is defined by the Press Law as a provider of “a free national platform 
for all political voices and trends and key actors.”3 In reality, these publica-
tions were used as a propaganda platform for the regime. Every publication 
is managed by a board of directors who appoint an editorial board consisting 
of five members and chaired by the editor-in-chief. The chairs of the two 
boards used to be appointed by the Shura Council, the upper chamber of the 
Egyptian Parliament. 
2. Al-Arabiya Institute for Studies, The Egyptian media landscape post-revolution, 12 
February 2013, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/12/265930.html (Arabic)
3. Ibid.
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According to the old constitution, the Supreme Press Council, headed by 
the speaker of the Shura Council himself, oversees the management of 
these publications. Three of these prominent publishing houses (al-Ahram, 
al-Akhbar and al-Tahrir) exercise a monopoly over publishing and distribu-
tion services, enjoying considerable financial privileges.
The broadcast sector was likewise monopolised by the state. Egypt was a 
pioneer in the broadcast sector in the Arab world, launching the first 
state-run radio service in the Middle East in 1934. The first television 
broadcast in Egypt was launched in 1960. The state-owned Egyptian Radio 
and Television Union (ERTU), established in 1970, was conceived as the 
control and regulatory body of all terrestrial channels.4 It has approximately 
43,000 employees and numerous television and radio stations. According to 
a report by the Arabic Network of Human Rights Information, the ERTU 
includes 30 TV stations and nine radio networks.5 Six different departments 
manage the ERTU, the most prominent of which is the news department 
which operates as a central newsroom and acts as sole producer of political 
programming. The ERTU is governed by the 1979 Law 13, which defines its 
overall mandate as to fulfil the “mission statement of the audio-visual media 
and broadcasting services […] in compliance with overall public policy and 
widely acknowledged professional standards and criteria.”6 A strong bureau-
cracy manages the ERTU: the general assembly, the board of trustees and the 
board of managing directors. The Minister of Information, who oversees the 
management of the institution and appoints its high officials, sits at the head 
of this structure.
4. R. Allam, “Egyptian television broadcast regulatory framework: Challenges and 
opportu- nities,” Article 19, 20 September, 2012, http://www.article19.org/join-the-de-
bate.php/80/view/ 
5. The Arabic Network of Human Rights Information, Maspero in the reign of t the first 
elected president, 8 April 2013, http://www.anhri.net/en/?p=12153
6. ERTU Law, Law No 13 of Year 1979 on the Egyptian Radio and Television Union, 1979.
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The policies of relative political and economic openness under President 
Sadat (1976) allowed the gradual introduction of private media, breaking the 
monopoly of state media enforced by President Nasser’s rule. The monopoly 
was breached to some extent by the advent of partisan media where polit-
ical parties produced print publications with a highly ideological tone. The 
most important move was the outbreak of the so-called independent press 
(2003), which was privately owned. The independent press7 introduced a 
different news format, which focused on the everyday problems and needs of 
ordinary citizens, as opposed to the excessive focus on governmental activ-
ities that was characteristic of the state media. The same decade witnessed 
the launch of private satellite TV ventures. The media state monopoly had 
been challenged further in recent years by diverse alternative news sources, 
such as satellite television channels and a range of pan-Arab newspapers that 
entered the market in the 1980s and the 1990s.8 Egypt also had a pioneering 
role in satellite media. It was the first Arab country to launch a satellite 
TV channel, the Egyptian Space Channel (ESC), on Arabsat in 1990. Egypt 
later asserted its regional media role by launching its own satellite, Nilesat, 
to support its national channels (1996). Nilesat was established as a joint 
public-private company operating Egyptian satellites. As of 2010 it broad-
casts 600 television channels and 100 digital radio channels.9
The post-revolution era witnessed a boom of national media outlets, espe-
cially TV stations. Religious TV channels, finally allowed to tackle politics 
for the first time, flourished. This coincided with a high number of licences 
granted for new TV stations, although with no change in the procedure of 
granting these licences. These religious channels were shut down immediately 
after President Morsi was ousted. They were accused of spreading extremist 
7. This is how private media is called as opposed to national state owned media.
8. N. Brown, “Can the colossus be salvaged? Egypt’s state-owned press in a post-revolu-
tionary environment,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 22 August 2011 
http://m.ceip.org/publications/?fa=45391
9. N.Rizk, N. &L. Atallah (2011), “Egypt’s Evolving Media Landscape: Access, Public 
Interest and Control,” in A New Frontier, An Old Landscape, (D. Hawton and A. 
Puddephat, eds.), New York: Ford Foundation, 118–136.
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discourse targeting especially women’s rights and the Coptic Christian 
community. The rule of the military backed government is witnessing an 
unprecedented campaign of media repression with frequent intimidation and 
journalists’ arrests decried by media watchdogs.10 
Media Regulations Pre-Revolution: 
An Oppressive Legal Arsenal
Egyptian media is heavily controlled by a variety of legal provisions that 
prevent Egyptian journalists from operating freely. In addition to the 
Constitutional Law and the Press Law, media is also regulated through 
multiple legal texts such as the Penal Code, the Journalism Regulation Law, 
the State Documents Law, the Party Law, the Civil Servants Law and the 
Intelligence Law.11
Articles 47 and 48 of the pre-revolution Egyptian Constitution guaranteed 
freedom of expression and media freedom, respectively. However, the govern-
ment could easily negate these rights through opposing laws. Historically, the 
most powerful control mechanism used to muzzle media and personal rights 
was the 1958/162 Emergency Law. It allowed for publication bans for reasons 
of national security or public order and tried offenders in military tribunals 
with limited right to appeal. The law was introduced after Sadat’s assassi-
nation in 198112 and was lifted more than 30 years later (31 May 2012)13 
only to be re-installed by the military-backed government for “the shortest 
10. Reporters Without Borders, “Freedom of information falls prey to military crackdown,” 
September 25, 2013, http://en.rsf.org/egypt-freedom-of-information-falls-prey-25-09- 
2013,45234.html
11. Konrad Adenauer Siftung, “Egypt,” KAS, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_14951-1522-
1-30.pdf?090708100317
12. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Emergency Law, Guide to Egypt’s tran- 
sition,” http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2010/09/09/emergency-law
13. CNN, “Egypt lifts unpopular Emergency Law,” 2 June 2012, http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2012/05/31/world/africa/egypt-emergency-law/index.html
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possible period” in the name of combating terrorism.14 It was finally lifted on 
12 November 2013 after three months of its implementation. 
A) Press Regulations
When President Nasser nationalised the press in 1956, the Press Law trans-
ferred the main print publishing houses’ management to the government. 
The same law abolished private ownership of newspapers, required any new 
publication to obtain a licence from the government, and strengthened the 
control of the ruling party over the media.15 The law was revised during the 
subsequent presidency of Anwar Sadat in the early seventies.16 With the 
re-introduction of the multiparty system, political parties in the opposition 
were granted the right to publish their own newspapers. The Supreme Press 
Council, created in 1975, would own 49 percent of the major publishing 
houses’ shares. The Council lasted until 1977 and was re-established again in 
1981.17 The Supreme Press Council was legally bound to give a response to 
an application for a newspaper licence within 40 days.18 However, one of the 
most common strategies to avoid granting licences was for the Supreme Press 
14. B. Daragahi, “Egypt’s interim government extends state of emergency,” Financial Times, 
12 September 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9913f734-1bc2-11e3-94a3-00144fe-
ab7de.html#axzz2oy8KOlhJ
15. A. Abdel Fattah, Press Freedom in Egypt, The Arabic Network for Human Rights 
Information, June 2008, http://www.anhri.net/en/reports/pressfredom/
16. Y. Chiba (2009), Media History of Modern Egypt: A Critical Review. University Research 
Information Repository, http://repository.kulib.kyoto-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2433/15 
5745/1/ssh_084.pdf
17. H. Amin, Report on the State of the Media in Egypt, Arab Center for the Development of 
the Rule of Law and Integrity (ACRLI), 2009, http://www.arabruleoflaw.org/Files/PDF/
Media/English/P2/Egypt_MediaReportP2_En.pdf
18. T. Mendel, Political and Media Transitions in Egypt: A Snapshot of Media Policy and 
Regulatory Environment, 2011, Internews, http://www.internews.org/sites/default/files/ 
resources/Internews_Egypt_MediaLawReview_Aug11.pdf
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Council to never provide a reply for an application. Obtaining a newspaper 
licence is a “special privilege” as per Article 49 of the Press Law.19 
The Press Authority Law No. 148 of 1980 acknowledged the independence of 
the press as a “fourth estate.” Even so, this law tightened government control 
by limiting media ownership to legal persons and parties.20 Newspapers could 
be privately owned on the condition that they would “take the form of co- 
operatives owned exclusively by Egyptians, with no one person owning more 
than ten per cent of the overall capital (Article 52) [of the Press Law].”21 In 
1995, Mubarak passed Press Law No. 93, which limited press freedom and 
came to be popularly called the Press Assassination Law.22 The bill labelled 
press freedom as a threat to democracy and it imposed lengthy prison terms 
together with hefty fines for journalists convicted of libel and other ill- 
defined publications crimes.23 Press Law No. 96 of 1996 stipulated that jour-
nalists can be imprisoned for diverse reasons such as intrusion into citizens’ 
private lives, attacking religious faith or government officials’ behaviour, or 
accepting donations from foreign bodies.24 The Press Law impeded individ-
uals’ and groups’ rights to create new publications, limiting this right to polit-
ical parties and legal persons.25
Such stringent restrictions resulted in the Egyptian press flourishing outside 
of Egypt –weeklies were distributed inside Egypt while legally based outside 
the country, mainly in Cyprus.26 These publications were free, in principle, to 
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. A. Abdel Fattah, Press Freedom in Egypt.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid.
26. Berenguer, R.D. (2002),The Political Economics of Foreign-licensed Publications in Egypt: 
The “Cyprus Press,” Michigan State University, , http://www.portalcomunicacion.com/
bcn2002/n_eng/programme/prog_ind/papers/b/pdf/b002_beren.pdf
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cover all topics. However, they remained under the control of the Ministry 
of Information, who could censor or halt distribution irrespective of where 
these publications were printed.27 The result was a foreign-licensed press 
tolerated in exchange for certain content restrictions.28
Although freedom of expression is guaranteed by the constitution and censor- 
ship is forbidden, there are approximately 35 articles in various laws that 
prescribe penalties for the media, ranging from fines to prison sentences. In 
addition to the restrictions imposed by press laws, the Penal Code of 193729 
can be considered the government’s most effective censorship tool. Prison 
sentences of up to five years are imposed for offences considered criminal 
such as criticising the president or a foreign head of state, publication of 
material that constitutes “an attack against the dignity and honour of indi-
viduals,” or an “outrage of the reputation of families.”30 One of the most 
restrictive provisions is Article 179, which imposes a prison term of up to 
three years for insulting the president. This article was used by authorities 
to silence the opposition, labelling criticism against presidential politics as 
personal insults.
In addition to these multiple restrictions, journalists face other challenges. 
Most local journalists operate without official recognition—and therefore 
protected—as members of the profession. The Journalists Syndicate Law No. 
76 of 1970 prohibits a journalist from working if he/she is not registered with 
the Syndicate. Similarly it is forbidden for any media outlet to hire a jour-
nalist not registered with the Syndicate.31 Nevertheless, a large number of 
journalists in Egypt are not registered given the tough conditions journalists 
must face to access this privilege. 
27. H. Amin, Report on the State of the Media in Egypt.
28. Berenguer, R.D., The Political Economics of Foreign-licensed Publications in Egypt: The 
“Cyprus Press.”
29. Adopted in 1937, the Penal Code has been amended many time
30. Freedom House, “Egypt: Freedom of the Press of 2011,”http://www.freedomhouse.org/
report/freedom-press/2011/egypt
31. A. Abdel Fattah, Press Freedom in Egypt.
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For instance, the Syndicate limits its membership to journalists who have a 
large breadth of published works and experience, thus putting young journal-
ists at a disadvantage.
The promise granted by Mubarak to abolish prison terms for journalists in 
cases related to the exercise of their profession (2004) did not materialise. 
Some amendments to the Penal Code, introduced in 2006, did not abolish 
prison sanctions for journalists.32
B) Broadcast Regulations
In the broadcast sector, different regulations apply to state-owned media and 
to independent satellite media (although the latter is not clearly regulated 
through any specific piece of legislation).
Created in 1970, the Egyptian Radio and Television Union state-owned 
broadcaster (ERTU) is overseen by the Ministry of Information and legislated 
by the 1979 ERTU law.33 The ERTU chairmen report directly to the Minister 
of Information who chairs the General Assembly, the main body overseeing 
the Union. Private satellite television stations are established in and broad- 
cast from Cairo’s Media Public Free Zone in Nasr City. They respond to the 
quasi-governmental General Authority for Investment (GAFI) and, while 
they do not submit to ERTU law, must obtain a broadcasting license from 
GAFI. The private broadcasting sector lacks a clear regulatory framework 
on topics such as diversity, fairness of representation, systems for allocating 
frequencies and rules on election coverage.34 
32. Ibid.
33. T. Mendel, Political and media transitions in Egypt: A snapshot of media policy and regu-
latory environment; CIMA, The legal enabling environment for independent media in 
Egypt and Tunisia. 1 september 2011, http://cima.ned.org/publications/legal-enabling-
environment-independent-media-egypt-and-tunisia.
34. T. Mendel, Political and media transitions in Egypt: A snapshot of media policy and regula-
tory environment.
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This opaque legal framework has been used as a tool for intimidation and 
to put pressure on private TV stations when their broadcast is deemed as 
“causing trouble” politically. The licences of private broadcasters allow them 
to provide a general service with no authorisation to broadcast news. The 
private broadcasters managed to bypass these restrictions by providing news 
in their talk shows, at the risk of governmental reprisal for breaching their 
licenses. In addition, these private ventures are linked by contracts to satellite 
companies that distribute their signals. These satellite companies are largely 
under government control, thereby setting an informal tool for additional 
control and possible restrictions on content.35
In the radio sector, the state exercises a near monopoly, restricting most of 
the FM frequencies to state broadcasters. The Egyptian Radio Spectrum 
Allocation Chart, which is responsible for the allocation of the frequency 
spectrum, provides most of these frequencies to ERTU stations only.
In 2008, the Egyptian government drafted a new media law, proposing 
the creation of a governmental agency called the National Audio-visual 
Broadcasting Regulation Authority.36 The draft law proposed measures that 
would have enabled additional censorship. However, the Bill was never 
passed into law.37
Constitutional Reforms: An Unﬁ nished Process
The interim constitution adopted by SCAF (the Constitutional Declaration) 
guaranteed media freedom and freedom of expression in Articles 12 and 
13. However, this freedom can be exercised only “within the law” with no 
clarification on possible limitations of this freedom. While Article 13 bans 
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid.
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media censorship, the article explicitly bans administrative censorship as 
opposed to all forms of censorship. Most importantly, this legal protection 
does not apply under the emergency law. This protection is also weakened by 
several restrictive legal provisions that contradict and negate it. 
The 2012 constitution adopted by the (now dissolved) constituent assembly 
was generally conceived as failing to protect freedom of expression. The 
constitution contains both articles that seem to protect freedom of expres-
sion and others that appear to co-opt it.
The constitution provides for freedom of opinion and access to information 
in Articles 45, 46, 47, 48 and 49. These guarantees are, however, negated by 
opposing legal provisions. For example Article 31 states that “individuals may 
not be insulted” and Article 44 prohibits “the insulting of prophets.” This is 
in addition to the Penal Code which criminalises defamation and has been 
used frequently to prosecute critics of the government.38 Indeed, Morsi’s rule 
witnessed an unprecedented wave of legal pursuits against journalists under 
Penal Code provisions.39 These include prominent media figures, notably 
the political satirist Bassem Youssef who had to face an arrest warrant for 
allegedly insulting Islam and Morsi, as well as “spreading false news with the 
aim of disrupting public order.”40
Article 49 of this constitution presented real progress; individuals could 
launch a publication by simple notification. However, the frequent allusion 
to restrictions in the name of national security and the possibility of closure 
of media outlets by court order undermined this achievement.
38. S. Magdy and N. Messieh, “Pervasive Use of Mubarak’s Legislation to Control Egypt’s 
Media,” Atlantic Council. 22 August 2012, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/
egyptsource/pervasive-use-of-mubaraks-legislation-to-control-egypts-media
39. Ibid.
40. BBC, “Egypt satirist Bassem Youssef faces arrest warrant,” 30 March 2013,http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21980343
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In anticipation of the abolishment of the Ministry of Information, the consti-
tution provided for the formation of independent councils tasked with over-
seeing private and state-owned media. Articles 215 and 216 caused a contro-
versy among journalists for their restrictive formulation, as they established 
two bodies to oversee state and private media. The allusion to safeguarding 
“society’s constructive traditions and customs” in Article 215 was denounced 
as a tool to prohibit coverage of certain topics in the name of Sharia.41 Some 
also argued that the new structure meant to oversee the state- owned media 
was just a revamped Supreme Press Council.
The changes introduced by the former assembly are now obsolete. A 
50-member committee formed by the interim government drafted a new 
charter from scratch to replace the 2012 Constitution.42 The panel was 
largely composed of secularists.43 The new constitution has been voted in 
mid-January 2014.
The interim authorities approved a draft law to abolish prison terms for 
insulting the president and replace them with fines. Another bill was rati-
fied amending Law 97 (1996), giving the president the right to form a new 
Supreme Press Council made up of 15 members. The new council would 
replace the one formed by the now-dissolved Shura Council. Unlike the old 
make-up, the new board will be comprised of the Journalists Syndicate head 
as well as media professors, writers, lawmakers and prominent public figures. 
The new Supreme Press Council is expected to serve a four-year term.44 
41. S. Carr and M. Adam, “In the name of morals and Sharia, media freedoms may contract,” 
Masress, 29 January 2012 ,http://www.masress.com/en/almasryalyoumen/1347611
42. D. Kholaif, “Battle intensifies over Egypt’s constitution,” Al Jazeera, 3 September 2013, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/09/201392125842364641.html
43. H. Schneider, “New Egyptian constitution may clamp down on parties,” Washington Post, 27 
August 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/new-egyptian-constitution-may-
clamp-down-on-parties/2013/08/27/bf3168b2-0f2d-11e3-a2b3-5e107edf9897_story.html
44. Ahram Online, “Egypt interim president appoints new board for Supreme Press 
Council,” 5 August 2013,http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/78366/Egypt/
Politics-/ Egypt-interim-president-appoints-new-board-for-Sup.aspx
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The new constitution guarantees media freedom and freedom of thought and 
opinion. It introduces the opportunity for natural and legal persons to own 
media outlets. Print publications can be launched by simple notification. The 
constitution recognises the obligation of public bodies to disclose information 
and documents. However, the lack of clarity on possible cases of non-disclo-
sure threatens to limit this essential right. 
The new draft abolishes censorship on media outlets as well as the repressive 
sanctions against journalists in cases of offences resulting from the exercise of 
their profession. However, the draft stipulates for exceptional cases allowing 
censorship on media “in war time and general mobilisation”. Repressive 
sentences may be taken against journalists in the cases of “crimes of incite-
ment to violence, discrimination among citizens or attacks on individuals’ 
honor”. Sanctions in these cases will be determined “by the law”, leading 
possibly to restrictive practices. It is important to recall that the current Penal 
code provisions criminalise “insult” and defamation, provisions frequently 
used to prosecute and silence critics. 
The new constitution recognises the “independence” of state media with 
no clarification on how this independence would be ensured. It establishes 
three independent councils to oversee the media sector. The Higher Council 
for Media Organization is entrusted with regulating the content of print, 
audio-visual and online media outlets. The council is responsible for guar-
anteeing media independence, plurality and neutrality. It is responsible for 
monitoring the sources of funding form media outlets and ensuring media 
organizations abide by professional standards and “the requirements of 
national security”.
The National Authority for Press is entrusted with managing and devel-
oping print state while the National Authority for Media is responsible for 
managing state broadcast media. The formation of these councils is left to 
“the law” with no further indications. The power granted to these councils 
over regulating print content contradicts international trends of self-regula-
tion for print media. 
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The allusion to the obligation to respect the requirements of national security 
using vague wording paves the way for possible political control. Furthermore, 
the provision which allows for the prosecution of individuals before the mili-
tary judiciary could lead to military trials of journalists. The article 204 of 
the constitution permits prosecution before military courts for “crimes that 
represent a direct assault on … the documents of the armed forces and their 
military secrets.”45
According to Rajai Mirghani of the national news agency, “there is a major 
problem in the lack of clarity on the definition of a +direct assault+ thus allowing 
an arbitrary interpretation of the article. However, it still represents a positive step 
compared to the old legal provisions which allow for the prosecution of journalists in 
the case of any coverage of issues related to the armed forces with no prior permis-
sion from the military.”46
The new constitution guarantees the independence of the new bodies with 
regulatory powers over the media. However, the success of these bodies is 
solidly linked to its structure: Who will be represented in these councils and 
how? How will these bodies be funded? What kind of relationship will they 
have with the political powers? What will their prerogatives be and how will 
these prerogatives be implemented? The debates on the establishment of 
these new bodies still lack a clear vision of their structure. 
There is a crucial need for clarity in the definition of the structure on these 
new bodies as well as redundant legal provisions historically used to further 
political control and manipulation. The trial of journalists before military 
courts should not be allowed under any circumstances.
45. See the full draft Constitution 2013 and the 2012 Constitution, http://www.constitu-
tionnet.org/files/final_constitution_-2_dec_2013-arabic-_signed.pdf; http://www.egypt
independent.com/news/egypt-s-draft-constitution-translated
46. Interview with author, December 2013.
47, See the website of the Panel of fifty with detailed information on the new constitution, 
http://sharek.dostour.eg/
It is important to note the new article 31 which was added to the draft consti-
tution, and considers cyber space to be “an essential part of the economy 
and the national security”, potentially justifying its control under the 
excuses of protecting the national security and economic interests. The new 
article is thus a serious attempt against the freedom to access and exchange 
information.47
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CHAPTER 2
State Media: From Propaganda 
to Propaganda
Historical Overview: A Snapshot
The state-owned media apparatus in Egypt was created and developed with 
the mission of promulgating the regime’s messages, enhancing its image and 
asserting its leadership in the Arab world.48 The state media apparatus was, 
and still is, solidly linked to the political regime. The Ministry of Information 
is one of the most powerful tools of the regime. After being abolished post-rev-
olution in February 2011,49 the Ministry was re-instated by SCAF on 12 July 
2011. Osama Heikal, a former military correspondent, was named as the new 
Minister of Information and was later replaced by Major General Ahmed 
Anis, who had been close to the Mubarak regime. The Brotherhood govern-
ment (August 2012) appointed Salah Abdel Maksood as the last Minister of 
Information in preparation for the Ministry’s abolishment. He was removed 
from his position with the ousting of the Brotherhood government but soon 
replaced by Doreya Sharaf El-Din, who was appointed by the military-backed 
government.
48. S. Magdy and N. Messieh, “Pervasive Use of Mubarak’s Legislation to Control Egypt’s 
Media,” Atlantic Council
49. Committee to Protect Journalists,” Egypt’s reinstatement of Information Ministry 
is a setback,” 12 July 2012, http://cpj.org/2011/07/egypts-reinstatement-of-informa-
tion-ministry-is-ma.php
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Together, the ownership system and institutional structure of the state media 
consolidated a conception of the media’s role as a platform to convey the 
government’s message. For Osama Saraya, the former editor-in-chief of 
al-Ahram newspaper under Mubarak, “the main function of state media was 
to embellish the face of the regime, not to monitor it. It was impossible to imagine 
another role for it.”50 Abdallah Kamal, the former editor-in-chief of the Roz 
el Youssef newspaper—well-known for launching smear campaigns against 
dissidents—explains the rampant politicking in media production:
 “I was working in politics. This is common even in Western media. There was 
no real political life and media was replacing the lacking political parties so it 
was overwhelmed by politics.”51
There are no accurate figures on the number of employees in the state media 
sector. It is estimated there are over 70,000 staff in this inflated structure, 
most of which are technical and administrative. The state TV and Radio 
Union employs around 43,000 staff, 7,000 of which are security.52 The state 
broadcast sector is indebted to the government by an estimated 13.5 billion 
Egyptian pounds (around 2 billion US dollars).53 Al-Ahram publishing house 
alone is estimated to employ over 14,000 staff.54 Asked about his plans to 
deal with the inflated number of staff in Maspero, the former Minister of 
Information in the Brotherhood government argued for caution:
 “It is not time to take drastic measures. We could use incentives for people to 
resign such as encouraging early retirements with generous financial compen- 
sation. The solution can only be by consensus.”55
50. Interview with author, June 2012.
51. Ibid.
52. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Maspero In The Reign Of The 
First Elected President: Violations And Undesired Reforms, April 2013, http://www.anhri.
net/?p=74883
53. Ibid.
54. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information , The Liberalization Of State Media, 
9 October 2012, http://www.anhri.net/?p=60501 (Arabic).
55. Interview with author, March 2013.
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Restructuring this bloated sector is a major topic of post-revolution debate. 
However, the adoption of drastic measures was avoided partly because of 
socio-economic conditions; mass cuts would create an unemployment wave 
among state media journalists and thereby a large dissident movement. 
Recent attempts to grant the state media independence from the political 
agenda have failed. Various ideas were discussed regarding the ambitious 
plan to transform the state media into a provider of quality public service, 
following the example of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC).56 A 
potential idea was to open up the ownership scheme of this media sector to 
their journalists and to the Egyptian people through a share-holding system 
managed by independent bodies.
The institutional reform of the state media from an extremely central system 
to a decentralised one would be another major challenge. The reform 
could grant various services autonomy from the central departments/bodies 
managing these media outlets. For instance, the ERTU is managed by six 
central departments, the most prominent of which is the news department. 
By operating as a central newsroom and acting as a sole producer of polit-
ical programming, the news department channels information to all state 
broadcasting outlets. This monopoly was breached with the launch of Nile 
TV station in 1993, conceived as a 24-hour rolling satellite news station 
with services in Arabic, French, English and Hebrew. The TV channel was 
first conceived as independent from the news central department, with the 
wave of relative media openness in the latest years of the Mubarak regime. 
According to former station director Sameh Rajai , the modern TV station 
managed to introduce “a new culture”57 in state media practices; old-fashioned 
agenda-setting, such as reporting on presidential activities first, was ignored. 
However, the station lost its independence—and relative openness—when it 
was returned to the hegemony of the powerful news department. In the print 
56. Several demonstrations called for an independent editorial policy for state media. See 
articles, http://www1.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1019150&, http://www.egyptin-
dependent.com/news/state-tv-news-staff-launches-protests-demand-independence
57. Interview with author, March 2013.
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sector, the prominent state publishing houses are managed by an equally 
centralised system.
The consistent manipulation of this state media for decades coupled with the 
regression of its professional standards lead to the erosion of public trust. This 
is exemplified by the Al Ahram newspaper scandal, where an altered photo 
taken at the launch of the latest Middle East peace talks was published. The 
edited photo shows Mubarak walking ahead of other participant leaders58 
while, in reality, he was second or third among this crowd. Asked about this 
manipulation, Osama Saraya, then-editor in chief of al-Ahram, argued that 
it did not happen under his directives and was the result of poor journalistic 
skills.59
If state-run media was already an unreliable source of news before the revo-
lution, its preposterous broadcasting of a “peaceful Egypt” during the upris-
ings further undermined its credibility.60 Some media went to the extent of 
describing protesters as agents of “foreign hands” or even “prostitutes.” This 
biased reporting continued after the revolution. A prominent example is the 
coverage of the Coptic demonstrations that were brutally repressed by state 
security on 9 October 2011.61 Before the horrific photos showing demonstra-
tors crushed by tanks were made public, television presenter Rasha Magdy 
called on Egyptians to rally in the streets to defend soldiers from “violent 
protesters.” Commenting on this coverage, the (former) head of the News 
Department Ibrahim Sayyad simply said: “This was not incitement to violence. 
The presenter was politically emotional. We admit this is a mistake. The presenter 
58. J. Shenker and S. Haroon, “Hosni Mubarak left red faced over doctored red carpet 
photo.” The Guardian,16 September 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/
sep/16/mubarak-doctored-red-carpet-picture
59. Interview with author, March 2013.
60. A. Hauslohner, “The most powerful weapon of Egypt’s ruling Generals: State TV,” Time 
World, 29 February 2012, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2107910,00. 
html#ixzz1xQAh8Y6l.
61. N.H. Rashwan, “Maspero survivors finally testify: Army shot at unarmed demonstrators 
without provocation,” Ahram Online, http://english.ahram.org.eg/~/NewsContentP/1/ 
24102/Egypt/Maspero-survivors-testify-army-shot-at-unarmed-dem.aspx
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was investigated and she is back to work now.”62 According to Sayyad, the 
state TV did not show the footage of killed demonstrators “to avoid fuelling 
tension.”63
The same discourse was used by state TV in the coverage of the bloody crack- 
down on Muslim Brotherhood supporters. State media along with private 
media echoed the military narratives, neglecting any reporting from the side 
of protestors.
Self-censorship has slowly become the main tool for control over media 
content with no need for direct government intervention. State control 
over the production of media evolved from overt to indirect control. Under 
Nasser’s rule, a censor sat in press newsrooms and intervened directly with 
news production. Later, the control process moved to the printing houses 
where a security official halted production if the press contained controver-
sial content. State control later adopted a softer approach through the nomi-
nation of editors-in-chief who were close allies of the regime. The “profes-
sional controllers” know what is allowed to be published and can make sure 
the content is respectful of the governmental restrictions. These notorious 
editors became the representatives of the government with large prerog-
atives inside newsrooms. A common way to implement self-censorship in 
newsrooms was to offer promotions to journalists or the potential to earn 
additional revenue by appointing them to advisory positions (whether for 
governmental bodies or for wealthy businessmen connected to the regime). 
This form of control proved to be efficient as the controllers—the prominent 
editors-in-chief—were journalists by profession, rather than security officials, 
and thereby knowledgeable of newsroom practices. These usual practices led 
to entrenched self-censorship mechanisms where journalists understand the 
red tape and abide by it without any need for external intervention.
As the main function of state media was to embellish the image of the regime, 
it provided restricted reporting on opposition groups and always with a nega-
62. Interview with author, March 2013.
63. Ibid.
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tive slant, such as legal cases against them. The street protests that erupted 
with the outbreak of opposition civil movements were covered only by private 
media and adopted a soft tone in their coverage, thereby avoiding giving 
a platform to the radical demands of these protests. For state media, these 
protests simply did not happen. This approach is currently maintained by 
state media. Major events that challenge the government are often ignored, 
even when about large mass killings. 
Post Revolution: An Internal Shock, Not a Revolution
Immediately after the resignation of Mubarak (22 February 2011), state 
media continued to do what it always had by applauding the new powerful 
men. State media moved automatically from denying the existence of an 
uprising to flattering the revolutionaries. For instance al-Ahram newspaper, 
which used to ignore the protests and describe protesters as troublemakers, 
ran the headline “The People Toppled the Regime” the day following the fall 
of the regime.
Immediately after Mubarak’s resignation, state media newsrooms embarked 
on two major battles: removing the editors-in-chief who used to symbolise 
state control and reforming the salary scales to limit disparity. The new 
editors were chosen by staff and are those who had the longest experience 
inside newsrooms. However, the change in editors did not follow any profes-
sional criteria and was largely a revenge process for the benefit of those who 
were marginalised under Mubarak. Thus, the shuffle did not always lead to 
the appointment of qualified managers. The need for the new managers in 
tune with staff demands obliged the new leadership to please staff in order 
to keep their positions. Winning the hearts and minds of staff included 
increasing financial incentives for them, therefore exacerbating the financial 
hardship of the state media sector. Under the interim governments which 
followed Mubarak’s resignation, a Deputy Prime Minister was assigned to 
implement the prerogatives of the then dissolved Shura Council, and appoint 
the editors-in-chief of state press. In the short period in which the Ministry of 
Information was abolished, the functions of this Ministry were exercised by 
l  35  l
Egyptian Media Under Transition: In the Name of the Regime…In the Name of the People?
the government-appointed heads of ERTU. After the formation of the Muslim 
Brotherhood government, the new Shura Council appointed new editors-
in-chief of state publications, sparking the indignation of journalists. They 
considered these nominations as an attempt to circumvent long-standing 
requests to free this process from the authority of the Shura Council.64 These 
positions were changed twice under the former Muslim Brotherhood rule.65 
The Shura Council’s call for applications for the positions of editor-in-chief 
of state publications was met with opposition from the journalism commu-
nity. Those in opposition demanded an end to all kinds of subordination of 
national newspapers to the Shura-controlled Supreme Press Council.
According to Khaled Sarjani from al-Ahram newspaper “the new editors repli-
cated the old managerial style. They did not take any measures for liberalising the 
internal structures such as enforcing editorial independence and setting clear edito-
rial policy and standards. There were no real changes inside newsrooms.”66
This is echoed by the journalist of Roz el-Youssef, Issam Zakariya. According to 
him, state media newsrooms witnessed an internal shock after the 25 January 
revolution, but it did not amount to a “revolution” in editorial practices.67
Despite this, two major accomplishments were achieved in state news- rooms: 
firstly, the opening of opinion pages and talk show debates to dissident voices, 
which boosted the credibility of state media. Secondly, the diversification of 
news sources away from the uniformity of official sources. 
This was another challenge as these newsrooms had applied redundant news 
formats for many years. As the competition became tough with the opening 
64. Al-Arabiya, “Egypt’s journalists protest new Shura Council rules for state-run press,” 4 
July 2012, http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/07/04/224408.html
65. Egypt Independent, “Brotherhood-dominated Shura Council makes second round of 
press appointments,” 4 September 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/
brotherhood-dominated-shura-council-makes-second-round-press-appointments
66. Interview with author, June 2012.
67. Ibid.
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of the media market, state media had to face the major challenge of surviving 
while suffering from a lack of resources, a debt crisis and out-dated structures. 
This relative openness did not overcome the entrenched habits of obedience 
and bureaucracy. The fall of the Mubarak regime left state media staff in 
limbo, unsure of how to proceed without directives, especially for controver-
sial topics.
Gamal Fahmy, the first secretary of the Journalists Syndicate said they 
continued to censor themselves:
 “The idea of prohibited information no long exists but journalists are used to it. 
They continue to define new red lines even if no one asked them to do so. They 
had to be reassured by the publication of the information by private media to 
consider the news as non-prohibited.”68
The experience of Ahmad Hamdy, the junior reporter of Nile TV, is instruc-
tive. He describes the heavy bureaucracy of editorial decision-making in 
the coverage of issues considered sensitive, stressing how these internal 
dynamics have remained in force post-revolution. However, the coverage of 
state TV changed after the revolution, according to Hamdy. An example is 
the coverage by Nile TV station of the violent clashes between demonstra-
tors and security forces in the so called Mohamad Mahmoud street events 
(November 2011):69
 “Our correspondent was not relying on the news provided by the official news 
agency as we used to do. He was in the street, when the police issued a commu- 
niqué saying that they did not use gunfire, our correspondent was reporting live 
showing us the empty cartridge in streets. We were telling what we were seeing 
and not what we were told to say.”70
68. Ibid.
69. M. Adam, “In midst of renewed clashes on Mohamed Mahmoud, remembering the 
violence of 2011,” Egypt Independent,19 November 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.
com/news/midst-renewed-clashes-mohamed-mahmoud-remembering-violence-2011 
70. Interview with author, June 2012.
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While there were some reporters trying to do a real job of journalism many of 
the old guard acted as a brake:
 “Our major problem is our editors who still follow the old practices, such as 
waiting for the government to issue a communiqué before reporting on the 
events. The quality of reporting is very much linked to the personality of the 
editor of the day. There is no clear editorial policy.”71
From SCAF to the Muslim Brotherhood: 
A Freer State Media? 
The relative change observed in the practices of some parts of state media 
did not evolve into a sustainable process. In the internal debate about state 
media, there is an obvious trend to distinguish between state-owned media 
and public media representing the people’s voices and not the government’s 
policies. However, it is not clear how this distinction is translated into 
professional practice for journalists. The lack of clear professional standards 
is accompanied by an internal trend among journalists to translate their 
newfound liberty into expressing personal views and unfounded accusations.
For Egyptian journalists, the military institution is a closed box where no 
information can be reported beyond the official communiqués. It is also 
considered to be the most well-established and feared institution in the 
history of the country. However, journalists’ testimonies demonstrate that 
even the Supreme Council (SCAF) was not totally exempt from media crit-
icism although with great caution, an operation led by private media. The 
military institution is historically immune from scrutiny covered by the law 
number 313 (1956; amended in 1967) that restricts coverage of the military. 
The law “prohibits publishing or broadcasting any information or news on 
the armed forces and its formations, movements, equipment and personnel” 
71. Ibid.
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without obtaining the written consent of the Director of Military Intelligence, 
or his deputy in his absence.”72 It is important to note that military affairs are 
usually restricted to the “military editor” within each media outlet, accred-
ited by the military and responsible for all coverage related to this institution. 
Breaking this entrenched taboo is a real challenge for journalists who face 
the threat of trial before military courts. Some of them developed different 
techniques to deal with controversial topics related to the military by differ-
entiating between SCAF as an administrative body temporarily tasked with 
running the country and the military institution. SCAF’s approach to media 
was ambivalent. They took some repressive measures against expressions of 
direct criticism and then backed off when the media community reacted to 
these measures.
The military generals deployed a PR campaign to seduce media by organising 
regular briefs for senior journalists from both state and private media in an 
attempt to pre-empt any possible critical reporting and to encourage positive 
reporting using a carrot-and-stick policy. The description of these meetings 
by the talk show host Mahmoud Saad demonstrates the extent to which 
these meetings were able to influence journalists’ perceptions:
 “SCAF invited some influential presenters and press editors. They met every 
one of us alone, they briefed us on on-going events. The aim was to provide us 
with accurate information so when we address our audiences we don’t mess 
up and we avoid rumours on the military. I could understand the real role of 
secret services, the nature of their work and to what extent they are involved in 
everything.”73
The rule of SCAF witnessed major protests that were harshly repressed by 
security forces. SCAF restored many of the censorship measures and intimi-
72. A. Iskandar,” Year of the ostrich: SCAF’s media experiment,” Jadaliyya, November 
2012, http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8135/year-of-the-ostrich_scafs-media-ex 
periment
73, Interview with author, June 2012.
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dation tools used by the Mubarak regime.74 An example is the decision 
of SCAF in May 2011 to summon talk show host Reem Maged and her 
guest, prominent activist/blogger Hossam el-Hamalaway, after they openly 
criticised the military for attacking protestors.75 The blogger Maikel Nabil 
Sanad was arrested for openly criticising the military in blog posts and he was 
jailed for 302 days on charges of insulting the military.76 Another blogger, 
Alaa Abdel Fattah, was jailed for publishing an article on the death of an 
activist during the army’s attack on Coptic protestors. Dina Abdel Rahman, 
a television presenter on a privately owned channel, was fired for reporting 
a newspaper article, which was critical of the SCAF.77 The military threat-
ened to enforce the emergency law, allowing the pursuit of journalists before 
state security courts. Other anti-press measures included the closure of an 
Al-Jazeera bureau and the freezing of the process of issuing licences to satel- 
lite television stations.78
Criticising the military will lead to serious consequences for those who are 
brave enough to do so. Most of journalists interviewed, from state and private 
media, described their way of dealing with SCAF as a red line they have to be 
cautious about without being sacred. The deputy editor- in-chief of the offi-
cial news agency (MENA), Rajai Mirghani, describes the change of dynamics 
in covering sensitive events post revolution when related to the military.
74. C. Walker and R. Orttung, “For Egypt’s state media, the revolution has yet to arrive,” 
Freedom House, 24 January 2012, http://www.freedomhouse.org/blog/egypt%E2%80%
99s-state-media-revolution-has-yet-arrive; D. El-Bey, “The state-owned media, both 
broadcast and print, faces an uphill struggle,” Ahram Weekly, 9 March 2011 http://
weekly.ahram.org.eg/2011/1037/eg22.htm
75. See the video of Reem Maged and Hossam el-Hamalawy discussing the meeting with 
military prosecutor:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OEO11WLnaDc&amp;feature
76. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Jailed Egyptian blogger on hunger strike,” 31August 
2011, http://www.cpj.org/2011/08/jailed-egyptian-blogger-on-hunger-strike.php
77. S. Yassin, “Egypt: self-censorship and the military hinder press freedom,” Index on 
Censorship, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2011/12/egypt-self-censorship-scaf-
press-freedom-egypt-independent/
78. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Egyptian military institutes new media restrictions,” 
13 September 2011, http://www.cpj.org/2011/09/egyptian-military-institutes-new-me-
dia-restriction.php
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 “Before, we used to ignore any news related to the demonstrations of civil 
movements. After the fall of the regime, we witnessed an unprecedented level of 
publishing news covering all street expressions. The relative red line was SCAF 
as we were reluctant to openly criticise the military council. But this was not as 
sacred as it used to be under Mubarak’s regime.”
Take the experience of Maysa’ Fahmy, a junior reporter for Ashourouq inde- 
pendent newspaper, in covering the polemic “virginity tests,” an important 
case that rose under the SCAF’s rule. A group of female protesters in Tahrir 
Square during the interim military rule were forced to undergo virginity 
tests.79 Fahmy recounts:
 “I attended a press conference during which women talked about a virginity 
test they were forced to take. I wrote an article but my piece was not published 
the next day. Nothing was published also in all newspapers. When I asked my 
editor for the reason behind not publishing my piece, I was told that people will 
not believe that the military police can do something like this.”
The timidity of journalists from both state and private media, in challenging 
the military discourse regressed with the expansion of violent repression of 
demonstrations under SCAF’s rule. However, they were unable to overcome 
this long-standing taboo. The threat of military trials make the coverage of 
topics related to the military a tricky one. This did not obstruct the coverage 
of abuses by security when reflected in a powerful image.
Some powerful images of abuses were captured and disseminated by tradi-
tional media, mainly the photo widely shared of a woman being stripped of 
her clothing by security officers during a demonstration (a photo taken by 
al-Masry al-Yom)80 and the TV footage of a civilian dragged naked through 
the streets of Cairo by police (taken by al-Hayat TV network).81
79. In March 2011, 18 female demonstrators were arrested during protests in Tahrir Square. 
After being transferred to a military facility, seven women were reportedly subjected to 
a virginity test by a military physician who was declared innocent later by the judiciary.
80. See the following YouTube clip: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PFFyKvSZqrY
81. BBC, “Cairo police beating: Victim Hamada Saber blames police,” 3 February 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21314782
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Muslim Brotherhood-Dominated State Media? 
Morsi’s rule witnessed an unprecedented wave of legal cases against jour-
nalists in the context of a hostile relationship between the so-called liberal 
private media and the new Brotherhood government. It also witnessed a high 
level of diversification of viewpoints in state media platforms.
The alleged attempt of the Brotherhood rule to dominate state media, 
(akhwanat el iilam, or “Brotherhoodisation” of media) became a major topic 
of debate on state media.82 It was seen as a part of the power struggle between 
the bloated civil servant apparatus, the so called “deep state,” and the alleged 
attempts of the Islamic new rulers to control the state institutions in order to 
implement their conservative policies.83
The Brotherhood government resorted to the arsenal of legal repressive 
texts that prevailed under the Mubarak regime to intimidate critical voices.84 
Most of these cases were based on legal provisions that criminalised insulting 
the president or religion, triggered by notifications from civil parties, mostly 
lawyers with Islamic background. There were around 30 legal cases against 
media staff and writers during the first eight months of Morsi’s rule, according 
to a report by the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information.85
82. Ahram Online, Egypt “TV presenters march on Tahrir to protest Islamist media ‘domi- 
nation,’” 9 December 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/60149/ 
Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-TV-presenters-march-on-Tahrir-to-protest-Isl.aspx
83. B. Momani, “In Egypt, ‘deep state’ vs. ‘Brotherhoodization’,” Brookings, 21 August 2013, 
http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2013/08/21-egypt-brotherhood-momani#
84. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Egypt steps up campaign against critical media,” 
3 January 2013, http://cpj.org/2013/01/egypt-steps-up-campaign-against-critical-media.
php
85. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, The crime of insulting the president, 
a crime of an authoritarian regime,” 20 January 2013, http://www.anhri.net/en/?p=10908
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Asked about the wave of legal pursuits against journalists, the former Minister 
of Information under the Brotherhood government argued these are legal 
practices:
 “The law allows any citizen to resort to legal cases against expressions of defa-
mation targeting the president given that he is representing them and they elected 
him. This is our law. The president did not intervene personally against any jour-
nalist. Most importantly, no journalist has been imprisoned under these cases.”86
An important progressive step was the decision of Morsi to ban pre-trial 
detention measures for journalists charged with press-related offenses, after 
a journalist was detained pending trial in charges of insulting the President.87 
However, the judicial summons triggered by complaints from citizens over-
shadowed this important development. According to the process, a journalist 
subject to investigation could be referred to trial before a tribunal with the 
possible imposition of prison sentence. The Journalists Syndicate is asking 
for the limitation of the right to submit a claim in defamation cases to the 
person(s) who is (are) subject of the alleged insult.
The alleged attempt of the Muslim Brotherhood to dominate state media was 
targeting the manipulation of both the media content and the appointment 
of a new leadership for state media.88
After abolishing the Ministry of Information, a military officer was assigned 
with overseeing the state radio and TV apparatus, thus sparking the rage 
of Maspero journalists.89 This was followed by the appointment of media 
86. Interview with author, June 2012.
87. Freedom House, “New Press Law Enacted as Media Crackdown Continues,” 2012, http://
www.freedomhouse.org/article/new-press-law-enacted-media-crackdown-continues
88. F. Elshhati, “As Cairo undergoes democratic transition, media remains at center of 
struggle for control,” International Press Institute, 12 September 2012, http://www.
freemedia.at/home/singleview/article/as-cairo-undergoes-democratic-transition-me-
dia-remains-at-center-of-struggle-for-control.html
89. N.H. Rashwan, “Egypt’s state media: Obstacles on the road to freedom of speech.” 
Ahram Online, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/4/17790/Egypt/Media/ Egypts-
state-media-Obstacles-on-the-road-to-freedo.aspx
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professor Sami al-Sherif as head of the TV and Radio Union.90 The latter 
had to resign after an internal revolt of staff against him. The interim author-
ities resorted to re-instating the Ministry of Information, nominating a 
former military correspondent followed by a military general to oversee state 
broadcasters.
According to Somaya al-Shinnawy of Egyptian TV and radio, “any change in 
leadership is irrelevant. All the second and third rank managers inside Maspero are 
known to be members of the Mubarak regime’s party.” For this journalist, who 
was investigated before a military court for her participation in sits-in within 
the state TV premises, “the new appointed editors were simply a replication of 
those who were removed.”91 She added “staff considered themselves to be slaves 
of any ruling regime. They don’t need any direct instructions. They will serve the 
regime as part of their identity.”92
The Brotherhood government resorted to the prerogatives of the old regime 
in appointing high ranking officials inside state media outlets sympathetic 
with them, mostly from the existing staff. The lack of a long standing 
“loyalty” among staff to the Brotherhood, especially in mid to lower ranking 
positions, made the operation of content control by the new government a 
thorny process.
Research findings show that the reaction of media staff to alleged attempts to 
manipulate and control the production of state media can be categorised into 
three groups: the first group of journalists simply shifted their positions from 
loyalty to the old regime to flattering the new regime for fear of retaliation 
and professional ambition. The second group was formed from media staff 
lobbying for an improvement to their working conditions regardless of the 
political agenda of the current government. Finally, the third group repre-
90. Asharq al-Awsat, A media professor appointed head of Egyptian TV and Radio (Arabic), 
4 March 2011, http://aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=610924&issueno= 
11784#.UsAW386Gm9h
91. Interview with author, March 2013.
92. Ibid.
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sented the few pockets of resistance among journalists who were lobbying for 
editorial independence from political power. However, this quest for edito-
rial independence was not channeled into professional structures and was 
frequently translated into a chaotic expression of personal views and beliefs 
in support of the “revolution.”
According to al-Ahram journalist Khaled Sarjani, the focus of the Brotherhood 
government was to build new mid-management leadership inside state 
media although this was not a straightforward process.93 According to the 
former Minister of Information under the Brotherhood, Maspero filled 160 
mid-management positions94 using a new system of competitions. This hiring 
process, which was not based on clear criteria, was portrayed by some jour-
nalists interviewed as a mere formality to legitimise the appointment of the 
new leadership.
If the appointment of new leadership is characterised as a relatively direct 
process, then control over media content was much more complicated.
The openness of the media sector to dissident voices in the immediate after-
math of the revolution was more noticeable in state media more than private 
media. This was reflected in the diversification of opinion pieces in state 
newspapers, a timid diversification of news sources and the opening of TV 
debate platforms for critical voices. The trend regressed gradually with the 
complication of the political struggle. 
Although strongly denied by the management of these state media outlets, 
journalists talked about a trend to lower the tone of criticism in state media 
by limiting the representation of radical and critical voices. There were spec-
ulations about unwritten95 black-lists for personas non grata, agreed upon and 
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid. 
95. Journalists have to ask for the approval of editors before inviting guests. There was an 
understanding, according to journalists interviewed, about excluding guests known for 
voicing radical opinions.
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applied by journalists in their choices of programmes’ guests. The allegations 
about blacklists are strongly denied by the former Minister of Information 
and the head of the state TV news department. The latter nevertheless does 
not hide his preferences for “moderate voices which aim to build the nation and 
not to destroy it.”96
Asked about the alleged blacklists of guests, the head of the news department 
Ibrahim Sayyad said “if a guest is employing obscene expressions and using our 
platform to settle personal accounts, he cannot be a regular guest with us. I asked 
the staff to invite the wise people and the moderate voices; those who have construc-
tive opinions that unite and not divide.”97
While there are no clear criteria for the definition of the so-called “moderate 
voices,” the staff members have interpreted it in their daily practices and thus 
tend to avoid inviting “trouble makers.” An example is given by an editor 
in the state TV news department who spoke on condition of anonymity: “I 
interviewed by phone a revolutionary leader known to be vocal against the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The director of programmes was angry and asked me to choose a 
softer voice. I asked him to provide me with a list of unwanted guests. He will never 
put it on paper.”98
According to the journalist of the state TV Somaya al-Shinnawy, “Staff are 
reluctant to invite radical voices for fear of retaliation. Under the military council, 
there was debate inside the TV if we can host (the former liberal candidate for 
presidential elections) Mohamed el-Baradei. During the election campaigns, all 
candidates were more or less represented. After the elections, some main political 
leaders were absent.”99
The same trend of exclusion of vocal critical voices is witnessed in the print 
sector. After having allowed a noticeable openness in opinion pages in the 
96. Interview with author, March 2013.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid.
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100. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Maspero in the reign of the first 
elected President: Violations and undesired reforms.
101. Interview with author, March 2013.
first months after the revolution, this margin of freedom was again narrowed 
with decisions to ban articles and writers highly critical of the Brotherhood.
A report by the Arabic Network for Human Rights Information counted 28 
cases of abuses and forms of retaliation against journalists and staff during the 
Brotherhood mandate in Maspero. 
These intimidations ranged from referral to the Public Prosecution and 
administrative investigations to arbitrary salary deductions. It included 
suspension from work, prohibition of access to the workplace, cessation of a 
programme or change of its identity among other sanctions. 
The report100 cites “mistakes” leading the imposition of these sanctions such 
as the participation in internal protests, expression of opposition against the 
regime, expression of critical opinions towards the management of the insti-
tution and repetition of revolutionary slogans during programmes.
Asked about this wave of intimidation, the Minister of Information of the 
Brotherhood government said;
 “In any media system, journalists and staff can be subject to investigation when 
they commit professional mistakes. A presenter for example praised a guest 
while he was expressing insults. This is not professional. Will this be accepted 
in western media?”101
The continuous increase in financial incentives for journalists exacerbated 
the financial crisis of state media. The tough competition from the private 
sector and the acute financial crisis reduced the state TV to poor program-
ming unable to stir the appetite of advertising agents. 
According to the former Minister of Information Abdel Makssoud, “the staff 
salaries were raised after the revolution by 400 percent. I managed to cut these 
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expenses gradually and by enforcing the professional bands that fix clearly the 
incentives for staff. Some of the staff are earning incentives while they are not even 
working.”102
For the head of the news department, the problem was a lack of discipline; 
journalists tended to express the newfound liberty in chaos. El-Sayyad said:
 “We are working for setting editorial guidelines and unifying the use of expres-
sions in storytelling. For example, we cannot report on trouble makers while 
using the word of +demonstrators+, they are in reality trouble makers.”103
Several journalists interviewed spoke of directives from the management to 
use the expression “trouble makers” in their reporting on demonstrations.
On the other hand, the internal resistance of state journalists against alleged 
attempts of content control is frequently expressed in a chaotic way in which 
the defining line between news and views is blurred. 
Take the example of sanctions taken against presenter Hala Fahmy for 
presenting an episode of her show on state TV (‘The Conscience’) in which 
she was carrying a shroud in a symbolic gesture to express the “death” of the 
Egyptian state.104 The excessive personalisation of this internal opposition by 
media presenters/ stars hindered the institution of an in-depth and sustained 
debate about professional editorial standards that should govern the prac-
tices of state media.
According to Soha el-Naqqash, an anchor of State Nile TV, “the problem with 
some of the opposing voices inside state media that they don’t know how to criticise 
without expressing explosive personal views”.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. The Arabic Network for Human Rights Information, Maspero in the reign of the first 
elected President: Violations and undesired reforms.
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Post-Brotherhood: 
State Media at the Service of the “People”
Diversity of voices, fair representation and professional standards were a 
concern for state journalists under Brotherhood rule. Now, the popularly 
backed military coup has been accompanied by an orchestrated media 
campaign to glorify the military. This appears to have plunged state media 
back into its past traditions of echoing the regime’s discourse and restricting 
its representation of the opposition to negative reporting.
Both state and private media are embracing a propagandist tabloid style 
and narratives demonising opposing voices, going to the extent of smear 
campaigns against critical opinions. Many examples will be given later in this 
paper. They are also expressed in a national campaign where songs chanting 
the glory of the army are repeatedly played on national media.105 This chorus 
of nationalistic anthems flooding the media spread a strong message of exclu-
sion of Brotherhood supporters, representing them as “evil,” “anti-Islamic” 
and “anti-national,” among other negative labels.106
According to a BBC Monitoring officer following Egyptian TV channels 
broadcast immediately after the military coup:
 “The state media and the private media instantly moved to supporting the army. 
They reacted on the spot to the military council statement, they supported it, 
they cheered it and adopted an ultra-nationalist tone…I haven’t seen or heard 
any pro-Muslim Brotherhood voice on any of these channels since 3 July.”107
105. See a video clip here for a patriotic song hailing Gen. Sisi, , http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_ETI-mMFAUU
106. The following songs state: “They are not our kids/ Those who lost hope and were bought 
by evil”: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=op4YPquQ1hA; see also the following 
song which states “We are a nation and they are another nation/ we have a God and 
they have another God”: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uQrwXE-RINQ
107. Y. Knell, “Egypt crisis: A challenge for TV channels,” BBC, 9 August 2013, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23635879
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After Morsi, a similar wave of internal revolts against editors accused of 
being close to the Brotherhood swamped state media newsrooms. In some 
of these newsrooms, staff agreed to the election of an internal committee 
that would be responsible for overseeing the production of editorial policies 
independently from the management. Yet, this remains a limited initiative. 
An entirely new slew of editors-in-chief were appointed lately by the new 
Supreme Press Council. 
Well-known columnists who used to praise the Muslim Brotherhood regime 
shifted to praising the military. Immediately after Morsi’s ousting, the state 
press was flooded with stories carrying all kind of accusations and conspiracy 
theories against the Brotherhood leadership, mostly based on “security 
sources” and “informed sources.” 
During the clampdown on the Brotherhood camps in Cairo the focus of 
state media, TV and press was to demonstrate the alleged arms used by the 
demonstrators against the security forces, the attacks against governmental 
buildings and churches and the active role of security forces in combating 
“terrorism” targeting the Egyptian state and people.
The state press is striving to play its traditional role as the main media source 
of exclusive information provided by the security forces. However, private 
media is also adopting this role. The anti-Brotherhood opposition during 
Morsi’s rule was spearheaded by private media, especially TV stations. 
Khaled al-Sarjani of al-Ahram said that the military is now in favor of private 
media:
 “The trust of the military in state press is not solid after the editors of this press 
leaned with the Muslim Brotherhood. They prefer to use private media as a 
channel for their information.”108
108. Interview with author, September 2013.
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The counter narratives are ignored in Egyptian state and private media alike, 
according to al-Sarjani from al-Ahram:
 “The view of the Muslim Brotherhood from the latest developments is not 
expressed. There are only a few signs expressed within the storytelling of events 
while the focus is on the governmental communiqués.”109
State media does not allow any criticism of the military even when it is 
expressed by a third party, according to Somaia el-Shinnawi, a journalist 
from state TV:
 “We had heated debates after editors decided not to air news of a communiqué 
by al-Qaeda chief slamming the Egyptian army. We told them it is not possible 
to ignore such news”110
She said that there are daily directives from management on what is not 
allowed to be aired in programmes and news bulletins.
Issam Said, a talk show host of a pro-revolutionary programme aired on a 
regional state TV station talks about a few pockets of diversity within the 
monotone and unilateral coverage of the state media apparatus:
 “The focus is on national broadcasters and TV news bulletins. They tolerate 
critical expressions in few programmes with limited impact while the general 
service is propagandist for the regime, any regime, as it had always been in state 
media.”111
Asked about the coverage by the state TV and radio of dramatic events that 
followed Morsi’s overthrow, the newly appointed head of the state TV and 
Radio Union Issam el-Amir is not apologetic:
 “There is a great hostility from the Egyptian people against the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The streets’ anger against them is overwhelming. Some of our 
109. Interview with author, September 2013.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
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viewers are expressing opinions such as +burn them all+. I asked presenters 
not to tolerate these expressions…we are the reflection of the streets’ pulse and 
people’s will. If we expressed views against people, people will remove us as they 
removed powerful presidents. We cannot go against people’s will.”
But aren’t the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood and other critical 
voices part of the Egyptian people? Issam el-Amir says that depends on their 
political status:
 “We will wait for their new revolution. If they will manage to go to the streets 
by the millions to overthrow the current regime, they will be the powerful.”112
112. Interview with author, September 2013.
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CHAPTER 3
Private Media: 
Independent Media?
Private Media: Diversifying the Storytelling
The Egyptian press was in essence private until it was nationalised by Nasser. 
The partisan press, allowed in the late seventies with the re-introduction of 
political plurality in the country, managed to break the state monopoly over 
media. The private press with foreign licences flourished as a way to circum-
vent the tough restrictions on granting national licences. The Egyptian 
independent press with local licences witnessed a pioneer experience with 
al-Dustour publication. Published first as a weekly and later transformed into 
a daily, al-Dustour was the main target of the regime’s pressure. It contributed 
to relaxing the media discourse by the use of colloquial Egyptian Arabic as 
well as the caricature as a tool to express criticism. It provided a different 
press model as a departure from the rigid formats of the state press.
The newspaper el-Masri el-Yom (2004) represented a new experience for 
Egyptian media by breaking the state monopoly over news, according to the 
newspaper’s first editor-in-chief Anwar Hawari:
 “We provided Egyptian audiences with a newsy output shifting the focus from 
the traditional centres of interest (government, president...) to social actors 
which are neglected by state media such as universities, civil society groups, 
the church… We were not interested in competing with state media over the 
official news.”113
113. Interview with author, June 2012.
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These trends were consolidated with the launch of a competing project, 
Ashourouq newspaper, which adopted an elitist way of providing analytical 
news services.
The independent media was able, to a certain extent, to challenge the rigid 
discourse carried out by state media without breaching established taboos, 
especially the person of the president and the military. It was accused of 
being manipulated by the regime as a tool to vent popular anger without 
calling for radical change. In the end, this thesis proved inaccurate. “Before 
Tahrir Square demonstrations, the regime was already under siege from indepen-
dent media,” claims Hawari.114
The solid link between the interests of these businessmen and the regime’s 
policies allowed a limited margin for independent media according to 
Mohamed Radwan, an editor of el-Masri el-Yom:
 “We used to push the boundaries and to back off when we were faced by strong 
pressure. Sometimes the pressure on the owner of the newspaper pushed him 
to interfere to lower the tone of the coverage. We were pushing the limits as far 
as we were not met with tough reaction from the regime. We finally managed 
to expand the margin of criticism to the extent of openly criticising the plans for 
inheritance of presidency from Mubarak to his son Gamal.”115
Although introducing an important element of diversity, the so-called inde-
pendent press did not manage to define clear professional standards and 
editorial policies independently from the interference of the major shares 
owner, termed the “anchor investor.”116 According to Radwan, the latter 
could change editorial policy from one extreme to the next, rendering the 
media outlet a tool to further their interests:
 “There is no legal framework establishing boards of trustees who will define 
editorial policies of these newspapers. The private press is treated as invest-
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Rizk, N.E. and L. Atallah (2011), “Egypt’s Evolving Media Landscape: Access, Public 
Interest and Control.”
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ment companies. However, we are not selling sugar; our product is contributing 
immensely to the formation of public opinion.”
The opening of the media market after the revolution witnessed the flour-
ishing of dozens of new publications, most of which had limited operations 
and sustainability. Among the newcomers were Tahrir newspaper; al-Watan 
newspaper, considered as the platform for anti-Brotherhood opposition; and 
the Brotherhood’s al Huriyya wal Adala. Other Islamist-funded newspaper 
publications include El Masreyon and Al Fattah, both of which adhere to 
Salafi ideologies.
Broadcast Boom
Although the print sector witnessed a boom of new publications, it is the 
broadcast sector that fuelled the appetite of investors.
The opening up of the media sector in the last decade has seen the burgeoning 
of “media empires,” some of them are owned by businessmen known for 
being closely tied to the Mubarak regime, limiting the pseudo-diversity of the 
private sector and transforming it into an elite privilege. The oldest of these 
TV kingdoms is ‘Dream TV Network’ (2001) owned by the prominent busi-
nessman Ahmad Bahghat an investor in household, electronic appliances 
and real estate. Hassan Rateb’s Al Mehwar TV network, comprising six 
channels, can be considered the largest Egyptian-funded media investment. 
Rateb, a cement business tycoon, was one of the main funders of Mubarak 
electoral campaign in 2005. Al Mehwar was criticised for its anti-revolution 
stance and accused of incitement against demonstrators. Another prominent 
businessman in the media sector is Mohammed el-Amin. He owns the Cairo 
Broadcasting Channel (CBC), a new venture that was launched after the 
revolution with large media operations and audiences. El-Amin also owns 
al-Watan newspaper, and al-Yom al Sabee (“the seventh day”), a widely 
visited online news website. El-Amin’s financial investments in this sector 
are unclear.117
117. Ibid.
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Al-Hayat TV network is considered one of the most popular networks in 
Egypt. Its main owner and chairman, el-Sayed Badawi, is the head of al-Wafd 
political party (opposition under the Mubarak regime) and a prominent busi- 
nessman. Another important business tycoon investing in media is Nagib 
Sawiris who is known to have solid investments in telecommunications 
under the Mubarak regime. He co-owns the newspaper Al Masri Al-Yom with 
businessman Saleh Diab and had to sell out the liberal TV station ONTV 
after being accused by the Brotherhood government of tax evasion. Another 
important figure is Ibrahim El Muallem who owns the prominent publishing 
company Dar Ashourouq, Ashourouq and Tahrir newspapers. It is clear from 
the above that there are strong links between these pseudo-independent 
media outlets and the political and economic elites. The attempts to limit 
the interference of the powerful media owners in the editorial policies by 
setting internal charters or agreements are new initiatives whose efficiency 
needs to be proven.118
The short-lived Muslim Brotherhood rule witnessed the burgeoning of 
a number of pro-Islamic media outlets that claimed to be funded by busi-
nessmen entirely independent of the government. These religious chan-
nels were forbidden from tackling politics before the revolution and their 
programmes were frequently suspended by the government. However, the 
most prominent of these TV stations, the Brotherhood’s “Misr25TV,” was 
not able to attract viewership beyond the Brotherhood supporters. TV 
stations with Salafi affiliations flourished and had a large reach among their 
main supporters. The most prominent of these TV channels—al-Hafez, al- 
Omma and al-Nas—provided religious and political programmes, adopting 
an extremist view.119 They were abruptly shut down immediately after 
Morsi’s removal.
118. The management of the online website el Yom al Sabee signed recently an agreement 
stipulating the separation between the ownership of the media outlet and its editorial 
team, http://www.youm7.com/News.asp?NewsID=1103229
119. F. el Issawi, “In post-revolution Egypt, talk shows redefine the political landscape,” 
Foreign Policy, 10 October 2012, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/10/in_
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The Liberal-Islamist Media War 
The influential private broadcast media has pushed the boundaries of what 
is tolerated. This has shifted the media discourse from a monotone narration 
of the regime’s policies to a somewhat more diversified one that allows some 
representation for dissident voices. The business interests of the wealthy 
owners of these media outlets did not hinder the development of this margin 
of freedom that was either extended or reduced depending on circumstances. 
After the January 25 Revolution, the divisions shifted from opposing the 
regime to a media war between two camps: the Islamic pro-Brotherhood 
camp and the liberal anti- Brotherhood camp. While the so-called liberal 
media claimed to be under attack with attempts to silence its voice,120 the new 
regime accused them of spreading lies and fuelling popular anger, calling for 
the “purification” of the media community. The most prominent example of 
this “war” was a frequent Salafi-led siege of the media production city accom-
panied by attacks and intimidation against media staff and their guests.121 
They were calling for purging the media of what they consider as Mubarak 
regime remnants. The tension between the two camps was furthered by crit-
icism against liberal media coming from high-ranking officials in the regime, 
among them Morsi himself.122
The Islamic-oriented TV stations and press were the spearhead of this war 
against liberal media and politicians. An example is Khaled Abdallah’s 
Al-Nas TV channel—known for its campaigns against secular political 
figures and the Coptic Christian minority. In an episode of his talk show, 
Abdallah threatened to behead a Christian viewer who sent him an email 
120. Al-Rasub, “12 Newspapers And 5 Tv channels strike For freedom of expression,” 
4 December 2012. http://www.alrasub.com/12-newspapers-and-5-tv-channels-strike-
for-freedom-of-expression
121. Egypt Independent, “Jihad organization calls for new siege of media production city,” 
8 January 2013, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/jihad-organization-calls-new-
siege-media-production-city
122. See the following clip on YouTube in which Morsi accuses media of corruption http:// 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlxMOeaJyGs
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insulting Islam. He denied that his programme was guilty of fuelling hatred 
between Muslims and Copts:
 “We are merely demonstrating the mistakes committed by Copts. When we 
commit similar mistakes, we are labelled extremists; but when they do so, their 
actions are just dismissed as simple mistakes.”123
On the opposite side of the spectrum, the ‘liberal’ media124 launched sustained 
campaigns against what they viewed as the ineptitude of the Islamic govern-
ment and its questionable links with foreign regimes. Talk shows became the 
platforms for criticising government policies and decisions. The worsening 
socio-economic situation in the country sparked fury against the Islamic 
government.125 
However the alleged plans to sell or rent out Egyptian historical and cultural 
symbols, part of a widespread discourse disseminated by liberal media, also 
acted as a powerful tool to fuel anger against the Brotherhood rule. These 
alleged plans were never fully investigated by media.
For Magdi al-Gallad, the editor-in-chief of al-Watan newspaper, presumably 
close to the military institution, it was not possible for liberal media to adopt 
neutrality.
He said: “this is a battle we did not choose. We were portrayed as evils: The spiri-
tual leader of the Brotherhood called us the media of shame, the newspaper’s offices 
were burned …”126 
123. Interview with author, June 2012.
124. They usually define their identity as non-religious or non-Islamic but not necessarily 
liberal.
125. See the following clip of a talk show episode in which the presenter is slamming alleged 
governmental plans to rent out the pyramids http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFV
45qcKocc
126. Interview with author, March 2013.
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Beyond lobbying for views, the publication of “confidential” documents 
is a powerful tool frequently used by national media in smear campaigns. 
Al-Watan, known for mastering this game, had published various allegedly 
leaked documents, such as suspicious bank accounts for senior figures in the 
Brotherhood leadership or tax evasion for business projects owned by them. 
“We published the full details and there was no reaction from the Brotherhood 
because they knew that our documents are not false,”127 said Magdi al-Gallad, the 
editor-in-chief of the newspaper, stressing that these documents were leaked 
from different sources including the military.
If the publication of leaked documents is not specific to the Egyptian media, 
the frequent use of these documents, with no independent channels to verify 
their content, exacerbated the political manipulation of media platforms. 
The fact that these documents are amplified, being re-published by news 
websites, the press and social media pages as well as being debated on talk 
show platforms, makes them a powerful political tool.
One of the major critical platforms against the Brotherhood government was 
comedian Bassem Youssef’s satirical programme, ‘el Bernameg.’ Youssef’s 
programme frequently ridiculed the government with direct criticism of these 
alleged plans to sell off national interests for the sake of regional connections, 
especially with Qatar.128 
One episode of the programme was aired post-Morsi with mild criticism of 
the powerful General Sisi. The channel (CBC) issued an apology statement 
announcing the suspension of the satirical programme. The program is now 
back, broadcast by the privately owned pan-Arab station MBC Masr.
There has also been a trend towards investment in news media as a business, 
rather than simply for influence. These media projects rely on the advertising 
127. Ibid. 
128. See the following clip on YouTube in which the comedian is ridiculing the connections 
between the Brotherhood government and Doha in a song which became a national hit, 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bpDQNoshDK0
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revenue despite the precarious conditions of this market. The sustainability 
of these projects is strongly linked to the success of agencies set up to attract 
advertising revenue, some of which monopolise large shares of the market 
and frequently intervene in the editorial policies.
According to Amer al-Kahki, the head of networks of an-Nahar TV stations, 
“our project is based on a feasibility study and it needs three to four years to 
achieve self-sufficiency.”129 Asked about the political identity of the network, 
he stressed “we don’t have any political affiliation. Our identity is that we are a 
business project and the owners have previous experience in media and in advertise-
ment. Our aim is simply to inform and to entertain.”130
The important influence of this media platform fuelled rumours about fierce 
battles over the control of this market between businessmen from the two 
belligerent camps of Islamists and liberals for political purposes.131
According to the Chairman of an-Nahar TV stations Walid Moustafa, the 
lack of transparency on media projects’ finances makes investigating these 
claims difficult:
 “Regardless of the source of funding which is not possible to be truly trans- 
parent, the most important matter is to define and implement clear rules and 
criteria for the production itself. This is not possible yet.”132
129. Ibid.
130. Ibid.
131. A.S Hteita, “Controversy over political funding of satellite channels in Egypt” (Arabic), 
Asharq al-Awsat, 10 January 2013, http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=37&ar-
ticle=731877&issueno=12613#.UsHMJ86Gm9g
132. Interview with author, March 2013.
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Post-Brotherhood Rule: 
From Independent to Ofﬁ cial Media?
After Morsi was overthrown, an unprecedented wave of anti-media repres-
sion followed. The liberal media transformed itself into a trumpet for the 
military, portraying the military take-over as a national operation to rescue 
the country from the Brotherhood, labelled a secret terrorist group.
The so-called independent media was a pioneer in introducing a diversity 
of voices in national media. However, the propagandist style adopted by the 
independent media post Morsi’s removal has nullified the difference between 
state and private. In doing so, the private media has lost its main raison d’etre, 
that of providing different and diversified media narratives. Instead of slowly 
pushing the boundaries, as it used to do under Mubarak, this media sector is 
now reduced to blunt propaganda for the regime. The exclusion of dissenting 
voices from traditional private media gives social media platforms again the 
primacy in allowing diversity beyond the dominant narratives of “the army 
and the people against terrorism.”
Immediately post-Morsi, the authorities launched a large campaign of repres-
sion against the media. The police raided and shut down four Islamic stations: 
the Brotherhood’s Misr25 and three pro-Morsi Islamist stations (Al-Hafez, 
Al-Nas, Al-Rahma). Al-Jazeera Mubashar Misr, a Cairo-based al-Jazeera 
affiliate, was shut down by a judicial ruling after its offices were raided and 
some of its staff members detained and deported.133 The Qatari channel filed 
a legal case against the Egyptian authorities, accusing them of detaining its 
staff, shutting down its offices and attempting to jam its broadcast signal.134
133. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Al-Jazeera station raided, 3 others shut in Egypt,” 3 
July 2013, http://www.cpj.org/2013/07/al-jazeera-raided-3-others-shut-egypt.php
 134. BBC Arabic “Al-Jazeera accuses the Egyptian authorities of arbitrary detaining its jour-
nalists and jamming its broadcast signal,” 12 September 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
arabic/middleeast/2013/09/130912_egypt_aljazeera_legal_actions.shtml
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The judicial ruling accused the channel and four other channels satellite 
channels of threatening national security and social peace.135 Reporters 
Without Borders criticised the ruling as a political decision that questioned 
the independence of the judiciary system.136 
This repression campaign is targeting media considered to be sympathetic 
to the Muslim Brotherhood or critical of the government’s decisions and 
policies. The campaign has included journalists’ arrests, temporary detention 
of media staff, confiscation of production equipment, and the blockage of 
pan-Arab TV channels by the Egyptian satellite operator Nilesat.
According to Reporters without Borders, more than 10 journalists have 
been detained (as of September 2013) without being brought to trial. Their 
detention is renewed every 15 days, the legal limit for administrative deten-
tion.137 The journalist of al-Masry al Yom newspaper, Ahmed Abu Deraa, 
was detained on account of his coverage of the military operations against 
terrorism in North Sinai, mainly the shelling the two villages by the Egyptian 
military forces. The journalist was referred to the military prosecution that 
accused him of publishing false news about the Egyptian army. He was 
recently jailed and sentenced to a suspended sentence of six months.138 The 
young Egyptian reporter Ahmed Samir Assem was killed by a sniper outside 
the Republic Guard building in Cairo while he was taking pictures of the 
building.139 
135. The Arabic Network of Human Rights Information, “Egypt: ANHRI rejects the closure 
of media outlets,” 3 September 2013, http://www.anhri.net/en/?p=13539
136. Reporters Without Borders, “Freedom of information falls prey to military crackdown.”
137. Ibid
138. Ibid 
139. The Independent, “Video: Shocking footage appears to capture moment Egyptian filmed 
his own death through his lens,” 10 July 2013, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/middle-east/video-shocking-footage-appears-to-capture-moment-egyptian-
filmed-his-own-death-through-his-lens-8700519.html
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Another journalist, a provincial bureau chief of Al-Ahram state newspaper, 
was killed by security forces after they opened fire on a car they thought had 
escaped from a checkpoint during the night time curfew.140
Although this kind of pressure has been frequently used by all regimes, it has 
become more systematic since the military take-over. This is accompanied 
by a hostile discourse towards the foreign press, which is accused of siding 
with the Brotherhood protesters. Many representatives of foreign media were 
attacked or killed while they covered the dispersion of pro-Morsi protesters 
by the military forces. Many were detained or arrested, according to the 
Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) Deputy Director Robert Mahoney:
 “Through a series of arrests, prosecutions, assaults and censorship, the Egyptian 
government has made one thing crystal clear to journalists: Deviate from the 
official narrative at your own risk. The authorities must stop this attempt at 
quashing independent and critical reporting.”141
Private media, especially TV stations, have turned out to be the favoured 
channels for spreading the military’s message. They strongly echo the narra-
tive of the authorities, mainly focusing on an eminent national threat that 
necessitates extraordinary measures and calling for endorsing all govern-
mental policies as a “patriotic duty”. 
Albert Shafic, the director of ONTV private TV, long perceived as the voice 
of the revolutionary, argues in defense of the media unified voice: “We are 
in a state of war against terrorism. We have to take a side, can we logically give 
platform to terrorism?”
140. Al Jazeera, “Egyptian journalist shot dead after curfew,” 19 August 2013, http://www.
aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381922624519858.html
141. Committee to Protect Journalists, “Press harassed amid heightened tension in Egypt,” 
13 September 2013, http://www.cpj.org/2013/09/amid-heightened-tension-in-egypt-
press-harassed.php 
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ONTV station along with others barely showed the footage of dead bodies 
of the pro-Morsi supporters in the Rabea al-Adawiyya protest site. Shafic 
argues:
 “We showed these bodies but we also showed other bodies, those of opponents 
killed by the Muslim Brotherhood and buried within the same site. We filmed 
them while they were transporting these bodies.”
Asked about how he got the footage and how he could verify its authenticity, 
he responded …“We had a camera there.”142
The coverage by private media of the crackdown of Brotherhood protesters 
played down the magnitude of mass killings decried by human rights watch-
dogs, by widely propagating conflicting narratives. Some of these stories 
include those of bodies already at the protest site prior to the security clamp-
down and arms confiscated from within the sit-in premises. It is simply 
impossible to verify all these claims with the absence of transparency from 
the government and the political alignment of national media.143
Ashourouq newspaper managed to provide different coverage from the 
dominant media discourse by allowing a larger margin of expression to crit-
ical voices.144 According to the newspaper executive editor-in-chief Imad 
Hussein, the unlimited freedom that used to tolerate unfounded criticism 
under the Brotherhood rule cannot be allowed under the current particular 
conditions:
142. Interview with author, September 2013.
143, H. Mcrobie, “From Morsi to Sisi: The evolution of targeting journalists in Egypt,” Open 
Democracy, 18 August 2013, http://www.opendemocracy.net/5050/heather-mcrobie/
from-morsi-to-sisi-evolution-of-targeting-journalists-in-egypt
144. This did not stop the management of the newspaper from banning the publication of an 
article considered to be highly critical. See article http://www.akhbarak.net/articles/1
3099549-%C2%AB%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%
A9_%D9%84%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%88%D9%82_%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%
D9%86%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9%86%C2%BB%D8%AA%D8%B3%D8%AA%D9%8
6%D9%83%D8%B1_%D9%85%D9%86%D8%B9_%D9%85%D9%82%D8%A7%D9
%84_%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%A6%D9%84_
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 “We started verifying the content of articles in order to make sure that there 
is no defamation that could bring legal retaliation against us. It is hard to be 
balanced. The first party in this struggle, the army, is known and we can publish 
its statements—but the second party is unknown. I cannot publish communi-
qués of dodgy groups; I don’t want to give them a platform.”
For the executive editor-in-chief of Ashourouq, the safety net to avoid any 
retaliation is to report stories such as the events in Sinai based on declared 
sources, whether it is the army or the people in the area:
 “I only publish statements of the army and residents of these areas or state 
employees there when they declare their names.”145
Most journalists interviewed said they are hostage to a strong populist mood 
in the streets that expresses rejection of the Brotherhood. Yet, to what 
extent has the media contributed to exacerbating these populist trends? The 
al-Masry al-Yom editor-in-chief, Yasser Rizk, known for being strongly anti- 
Brotherhood, said “we were the spearhead of the battle to topple the Muslim 
Brotherhood by uncovering their failures. We did not create it. This was their 
reality.”
Only few media voices are distinguishing themselves from this dominant 
discourse. However these few do not challenge it. This margin is mainly 
harboured by the independent press. Samir Ahmed, who writes opinion 
articles for al-Masry al-Yom, is one of these voices (he recently moved to 
Ashourouq newspaper). The young journalist explains, “There is no direct 
dictate from the government. Journalists are practicing self-censorship.”
After the Brotherhood overthrow, we witnessed a growing trend of publishing 
leaked documents provided by “sovereign sources,” “security sources” and 
sometimes openly citing the secret services.
These leaks became the new battlefield between the new regime and the 
embattled Brotherhood. A series of statements by General Sisi in which he 
145. Interview to author, September 2013.
l  66  l
Egyptian Media Under Transition: In the Name of the Regime…In the Name of the People?
controversially calls for suppression of the media and personal immunity 
against prosecution were leaked but barely picked by the national media. 
On the other hand, the new regime is feeding national media with exten-
sive leaked material discrediting not only the Brotherhood leadership but 
also revolutionary leaders who are mostly imprisoned for breaching the new 
protest law. These documents widely shared and discussed on media plat-
forms are becoming the occasion for fierce defamation campaigns against 
opposing voices.147 
The fear of being singled out from this media orchestration limits the scope 
of critical voices among the community of journalists; the blurred identity of 
journalists and activists, as well as the understanding of journalists having a 
“patriotic duty” that should guide their practices, are contributing to lowering 
these voices. 
Take the example of Soha Naqqash, a news anchor in the state TV (she 
recently moved to ONTV channel). With the first wave of bloody repressions 
against the pro-Morsi demonstrators, she posted a critical view distancing 
herself from the coverage of the state TV (which totally ignored the incident) 
on her Facebook page. The Facebook post was largely shared among journal-
ists and used by the websites sympathetic to the Brotherhood. Naqqash had 
to give interviews the next day to explain that her critical view was purely 
professional and not related to any political support for the Brotherhood.
Soha explains, “This was a professional call that no one wants to support.. 
When I tried to say to colleagues that the coverage could be different, I was simply 
silenced.”148
146. Interview with author, September 2013
147. Al-Arabiya, “Egypt prosecutor probes accusations that activists were ‘foreign funded’,” 8 
September 2013, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/08/-Egypt-
Prosecutor-begins-probe-on-activists-for-foreign-funding-.html
148. Interview with author, September 2013.
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The media representing the Muslim Brotherhood that continue to operate 
under these conditions are limited to the online website of the Freedom and 
Justice newspaper and a restricted circulation of the paper.149 According to 
Hazem Ghourab, the head of Misr 25 TV station that was lately closed, “the 
communication of our message is mainly by direct contact with activists in demon-
strations and via social media platforms which are becoming the main platform for 
us not only to communicate but also to uncover the wrongdoings and scandals of 
the military government.”
For the head of the main media platform for the Brotherhood, now closed, 
the current media environment is a “new nationalisation of media empowered 
by an implicit deal between the regime and the owners of private media” leading 
to the replication of the unilateral media discourse that was prevailing under 
Nasser.150
149. See the link to the website http://fj-p.com/
150. Interview with author, October 2013.
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CHAPTER 4
Media Values and Professionalism
In Egypt—What Does it Mean to be Professional?
As described by journalist and syndicate officer Gamal Fahmy, the Egyptian 
media post-revolution transformed into a free-for-all: a platform for freedom 
of expression of any and all opinions. Unlike other Arab media industries, 
the Egyptian media transition began in the last years of the Mubarak regime. 
The aim of this media relaxation was to absorb the growing tension resulting 
from the deterioration of the socio-economic conditions and limited political 
participation according to Fahmy:
 “We are the country that invented the expression of ‘democratic margin’. We 
lived in this margin of democracy for 34 years. The regime believed that this 
margin would never extend. This proved incorrect.”151
However, this model of chaotic expression of opinions is not new for the 
Egyptian media which has seen it expressed in the sensational tabloid media. 
Under Mubarak, the tabloid style was limited to the opposition papers. The 
sensational reporting style became later the common media model especially 
under the Brotherhood. This trend was led by private media and copied by 
the state-owned media sector that acquired some bravery before retreating 
again to self-censorship. Some of the features of the tabloid media style are 
the “political clubs” introduced by talk show hosts and used as a platform for 
political lobbying. Talk shows replaced the weak political parties and acted as 
an influential platform to de-legitimise the political adversary.
151. Interview with author, June 2012.
152. Interview with author, June 2012.
153. Ibid.
The change of the political landscape post-revolution left both the private 
and state media in a state of confusion as to how they would define “media 
professionalism.” “Media staff lost their compass,” said Mohamed Khair, a free-
lance journalist and writer:
 “Under the former regime, the relationship between the political system and 
the media was clear and stable, whether it was positive or negative. This solid 
structure no longer existed.”152
This confusion is aggravated by the decline of the conventional sources (the 
official communiqué) with the growing role of social media platforms as an 
influential tool for feeding traditional media. It became usual for journalists in 
traditional media to publish stories according to posts in Facebook or twitter 
feeds and without taking the efforts to verify its content. The Journalists, 
meanwhile, are not able to develop investigative techniques independently 
from official statements. The combination of these elements leads to a story-
telling model based mainly on rumours and unnamed sources. According to 
Khair “the chaotic media scene is linked to the chaotic political scene after decades 
of stability.”153
With the changes in the political scene, the definition of reliable news-
worthy information became opaque. Under the former regime, journalists’ 
understanding of news was solidly linked to the information provided by offi-
cial communiqués. This narrative was challenged by private media, which 
extended it to the coverage of citizens’ everyday problems and opposition 
movements. However, this did not develop into solid investigative reporting 
traditions. The post-revolution phase with its extraordinary developments 
made the debate on professional standards a secondary issue for journalists 
and their editors.
Talk show host Mahmood Saad says reporting in this environment has 
become complex:
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 “The official sources responsible for providing information for media are 
becoming limited. We have to contact different sources to be able to report 
on the story. For example, in reporting the story of a lawyer beaten in a police 
station, no statement was issued from an official source. Under the former 
(Mubarak) regime, we had at least official sources we could contact.”154
This is echoed by Manal el-Diftar, head of new services at CBC network, who 
says it was even more complex under the Brotherhood government:
 “The worst enemy of news is rumours. Most of the information we got from the 
government or the presidency is a denial of non-confirmed information reported 
by media. If we asked about official information to elucidate the story, we have 
no answer. We have to always deal with unfinished stories.”155
After the January 25 Revolution, the diversity of voices in media platforms 
extended tremendously. However, this trend for a fair representation of polit-
ical actors is noticeable only in the coverage that does not generate tension 
between the two belligerent camps. The quest for relatively fair representa-
tion regresses when the coverage tackles a highly divisive topic leading to 
biased coverage in the name of “national” or “revolutionary” ideals.156
Hazem Ghourab of the now-extinct Misr 25 TV station said the presidential 
elections were an example of this polarisation:
 “There is nothing called neutrality. This is a lie. There is a professional bias. In 
the second round of the presidential elections, I was biased to the candidate of 
the revolution (Morsi), in the name of patriotism.”157
154. Ibid.
155. Interview with the author, March 2013.
156. Cairo Institute for Human Right Studies, Assessing Media Outlet Performance During 
The First Phase Of 2011 Egyptian parliamentary Election, 2011, http://www.cihrs.org/?p= 
347&lang=en
157. Interview with the author, June 2012.
l  72  l
Egyptian Media Under Transition: In the Name of the Regime…In the Name of the People?
If the diversity of voices in media platforms extended noticeably after the 
January 25 Revolution, this important development did not lead to an 
inquisitive reporting style that went beyond the simple expression of opin-
ions. Hani Shukrallah, the former editor-in-chief of al-Ahram online, (the 
English online news website of the state al-Ahram publishing house) believes 
that Egyptian media missed a golden opportunity to develop investigative 
reporting, leaving the field to social media:
 “Topics are endless such as torture in prisons or the killing of demonstrators; 
traditional media could expose all these cases. However, we don’t have the 
required media skills and media managements are not willing to invest time and 
money for this kind of reporting.”158
This “formal media freedom” of unprecedented media bravery during the 
short-lived Brotherhood government cannot amount to an established media 
freedom. It is not embedded in adequate professional and legal structures that 
would provide support for journalists to operate in a professional manner. 
According to Gamal Fahmy from the Journalists’ Syndicate:
 “National media was not able to benefit from the high ceiling of freedoms, 
professional capacities were gravely diminished under the Mubarak regime, 
media is unable to develop its own tools for professional advancement.”159
Social media has affected mainstream media by allowing a less hierarchical 
communication dynamics, forcing traditional media to follow the trend.160 
However, this impact is perceived by some traditional journalists as exacer-
bating the widespread confusion between information, lobbying and smear 
campaigns.
Abdallah Kamal, the former editor in chief of Roz el Youssef state newspaper, 
gives an example:
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. Khamis, S. & Vaughn, K. (2011), Cyberactivism in the Egyptian revolution: How civic 
engagement and citizen journalism tilted the balance. Arab Media & Society, issue 13, 
summer 2011: http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=769
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 “I can publish a few lines in my Twitter account in the morning. These lines 
will be published by a low key online website and later discussed in talk shows. 
Important political institutions will be dragged to comment on it. But, at the 
start, the journalist who published my tweet did not take the effort to check the 
information.”161
Kamal argues that this situation is leading to a naïve relationship between 
the media, the political sphere and public opinion.
After the popularly backed military coup, social media platforms regained 
their role as the provider of a diversity of views while traditional media 
returned to exercising self-censorship on its content, limiting itself to echoing 
the military discourse in reporting controversial developments. For instance, 
the management of the state issued directives to staff to verify guests have 
no sympathetic ideas with the Brotherhood immediately after the decision 
of the government to declare the Brotherhood a “terrorist organization” (25 
December 2013)162
This self-censorship is not imposed on journalists by fear of retaliation but 
rather adopted by journalists and enforced in their production as an expres-
sion of their leaning with the “state” against the “terrorists.” It is important 
to note that the government is not hiding its unease in dealing with critical 
media narratives, frequently calling media to stick to the story provided by 
official sources of highly important events.163
161. Interview with author, June 2012.
162. Sada el Balad, “The state television accepts the directives of the government and labels 
the Brotherhood as terrorists”, 26 December 2013, http://www.el-balad.com/761716
163. Ahram Online, “Egypt’s interior ministry calls on media to only publish official info on 
bomb blast,” 6 September 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/80975/
Egypt/Politics-/Egypt’s-interior-ministry-calls-on-media-to-only-p.aspx; Ahram Online, 
“Coordination with military required to publish info on army: Spokesman,” 28 
September 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/82724/Egypt/ Politics-
/Coordination-with-military-required-to-publish-inf.aspx
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Take the example of al-Masry el-Yom independent newspaper in the coverage 
of the military operations in Sinai. Mohamed Radwan, one of the editors of 
the newspaper, explains:
 “There is some blackout on information published on military operations. 
I don’t agree with it but I can understand its reasons, mainly the spread of 
terrorist operations against the army in Sinai. There is not enough information 
on civilians’ losses during these operations coming from the military. This is 
left for information provided by residents of these towns. We publish a few of 
these accounts but not that much, because we are with the state and against 
terrorism. Our policy is not to give much platform for accounts or statements 
against the army.”164
While the official communiqué is again the major source for news dissemi-
nated by traditional media, the narratives ranging out of this discourse are 
limited to minimal pro-Morsi demonstrations coverage, usually presented as 
fought back by “residents of the areas where it is occurring.” The coverage 
includes a few opinion articles/talk shows tackling critical topics such as the 
excessive use of force for security, torture in prisons and the deterioration of 
living conditions. However, these critical views constitute a variation in the 
current dominant media discourse without challenging it.
Such orchestration of the media is played down by Gamal Fahmy the Secretary 
General of the Journalists’ Syndicate, who describes it as “an exceptional case 
which cannot last, mainly linked to the large popularity of the army as well as the 
quest of some of these journalists to gain popularity from leaning with the army.” 165 
Talk Shows: The Political Clubs
Talk show slots represent a major production in the Egyptian broadcast 
sector. Under the shaky and complex political transition, talk show moder-
ators have become arbiters of public opinion and contributors to shaping 
164. Interview with author, September 2013. 
165. Ibid.
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the political discourse.166 When they assumed this role under the Mubarak 
regime, they became a main driving force in the battle between Islamists and 
liberals during the Brotherhood rule. Accused of fuelling political tension, 
these lengthy slots played a major role in the popularisation of information 
from the elite to the wider population, in a country where illiteracy rates are 
high167 and TV represents the main provider of information.
The rise of these popular political TV shows started in the last years of the 
Mubarak regime. Their appearance coincided with the relative opening up of 
the political landscape, including the appearance of civil society opposition 
groups. Talk shows were able to tackle touchy topics without crossing estab- 
lished “red lines,” above all direct criticism of the President and his family. 
One of the most popular of these shows was “el Beit Beitak”168 (“My Home Is 
Your Home”), the flagship programme of state TV. It was launched as part 
of the attempt to reform state media in order to revamp the image of the 
regime in its latest years and in the face of growing deterioration of the state 
media. The programme tackled controversial issues without contravening 
strict taboos.169 The private broadcast sector has also developed a niche for 
primetime talk shows.
After the January 25 Revolution, talk show hosts gained more courage, 
allowing their stars to challenge politicians directly on air in a departure from 
the flattering style usually adopted when interviewing politicians. A promi-
nent example is the talk show episode in which Ahmed Shafik, appointed 
by Mubarak during the revolution to serve as Prime Minister, was severely 
166. F. el Issawi, “In post-revolution Egypt, talk shows redefine the political landscape.”
167. According to the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS), 
the total number of illiterate people aged 10 years or more has exceeded 16 million 
in 2012, http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/capmas-more-16-million-illiterate-
people-egypt-2012
168. See the following clip on YouTube on the show: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
oJQZA03nUAQ
169. F. el Issawi, “In post-revolution Egypt, talk shows redefine the political landscape.”
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challenged by prominent ONTV talk show hosts Reem Maged and Yosri 
Fouda.170 The following day, Shafik announced his resignation.
The “hot” political scene of the post-revolution, with its fast-moving pace 
and extraordinary developments, transformed televised talk shows into a 
crucial media platform for covering and debating these developments—espe-
cially since news bulletins were limited. For decades, news services were a 
monopoly for state media. The monotone and unilateral content of these 
news bulletins covering mainly governmental activities made them unap-
pealing to large audiences. Private stations are not allowed by their licences 
to provide news services. Under these conditions, talk shows developed 
news slots in which reporting news from different regions is mixed with the 
personal views and commentary of the presenter.
After the revolution, the deluge of talk shows and the fierce battle between 
presenters and channels over the hearts and minds of Egyptians confirmed 
the importance of these TV platforms as both forums for debate and news 
providers as well as main attraction for advertisement revenues.
During the rule of the Brotherhood, the talk show scene extended to new 
players; the religious preachers who used to be limited to religious content in 
their talk shows were granted the opportunity to talk politics. The preachers 
of Salafi TV stations were the most active in lobbying for Islamic political 
agendas. For instance, Khaled Abdullah,171 the prominent preacher of al-Nas 
TV station, believes that his show was instrumental in boosting the chances 
of Salafi candidates in parliamentary elections by openly calling his audience 
to vote for them.
The accentuated mentoring role of talk show hosts contributed to nurturing 
the “free for all” style of transitional Egyptian media. These televised shows 
170. See the following clip on YouTube from the talk show: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=jo61wpG_9i4
171. See the following clip on YouTube for one of the show’s episodes: http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=9Nq3TzN1a4A
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which act as political platforms have limited structure and can be understood 
as a way to communicate the talk show host’s thoughts and inclinations. 
They provide coaching for political leaders, attacking those who stand in the 
opposing camps and commending/advising those who belong to their own 
camp. These debates can extend on for hours, going beyond the usual format 
of the programme. The moderator is an active player in the debate expressing 
his/her views and frequently answering the questions that were meant to be 
addressed to the guest.
For talk show hosts, assuming neutrality could be understood as an act 
of treason. This freedom is a luxury they said they could not afford in the 
raging political battles under Brotherhood rule. When asked about his role in 
“guiding” public opinion, Mohmood Saad, one of the highest paid talk show 
hosts in Egypt, expresses his rejection of the objectivity requirement:
 “Some people prefer to offer an opinion implicitly. I choose to express my 
opinions clearly. As far as I’m concerned, I’m not a simple presenter. I’m a 
journalist.”172
This activist role is also stressed by Tamer Amin, a prominent talk show host. 
For him, his role is not to report the news but to “make news, not just deliver 
it.” In so doing, he believes he can “propose solutions to current problems, thus 
urging decision-makers to respond to it.” He believes his audience is not ready 
for objectivity:
 “There is a difference between the public opinion in the West and that in Arab 
countries. Here, they need to be told what to think. They need guidance. I try 
not to express my opinion but I received phone calls from my audience asking 
me to give them advice.”173
There is a common understanding among these media stars that the ideals 
of Western impartiality are incompatible with the nature of the Egyptian 
audiences and could constitute a barrier against the popularity of the talk 
172. Interview with author, June 2012.
173. Ibid.
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174. See an episode of Amer’s talk show al-Hayat el-Yom (Life Today),, http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=AfSPLeD40a0
175. Mubarak addressed the Egyptian people stressing his achievements in serving the 
country. The speech was considered highly emotional and contributed to redress his 
image. The talk show host Mona Shazli cried on air after the speech ended. See the 
following YouTube video: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHkVQydCtNk
176. Interview with author, March 2013.
177. See this YouTube video in which the talk show host Wael el Ibrachy talks about his 
decision not to air an interview with the Muslim Brotherhood spiritual leader with 
controversial information http://www.alnaharegypt.com/t~148438
show host. This view is strongly refuted by Sherif Amer174 who represents a 
different approach to moderating talk shows:
 “I did not cry on air when Mubarak gave his emotional speech175 before resig- 
nation. I did not celebrate when we was overthrown.” He adds “I avoid inde- 
cent expressions although I tackle all topics. I monitor my discourse with rigour, 
I made no mistakes the regime, any regime, can use to blackmail me.”
According to Amer, who had previous experience in Western media, the 
Mubarak regime use to blackmail prominent talk show hosts to push them 
not to tackle some topics in return for turning a blind eye to some suspicious 
business projects/deals. “This is a dirty business, I don’t play this game,”176 he 
said.
The dubious relationships between these prominent talk show hosts and 
regimes are disclosed in frequent confessions by these stars about “deals” 
with politicians or military officers to blackout information or to dissemi-
nate rumours.177 Furthermore, there is a widespread accusation that talk 
show hosts gain a percentage of advertisement revenues broadcasted on their 
shows. All media owners and talk show hosts interviewed denied it. The 
popularity of these slots makes the time allocated for advertisement in some 
cases equivalent to the content of the programme itself.
Amer’s detached and sober style, considered “respectable” but not necessarily 
popular, constitutes a departure from the talk show scene in Egypt. On the 
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other side of the spectrum is Rim Maged,178 whose support for the revolution 
from day one turned her into a media star/activist. When the demonstrations 
grew, Maged left the studio for her “natural place”: Tahrir square. There, Maged 
supported demonstrators and gave direct interventions to international media.
She claims she can bring together the two different roles of talk show host 
and an activist serving a cause:
 “I have struggled between my professional and human identities. Talk shows 
are a powerful weapon. I will not renounce this weapon in the service of my 
cause while others are still using it for the service of their causes.”179
The popularity of talk show slots is making their hosts the sole decision-makers 
on their content and format. Most of these talk show hosts have their own 
production team and the management of the TV station has little say unless 
it is threatening the owners’ interests with the regime. The revenues from 
advertisement are consolidating the authority of these hosts, leading to an 
implicit struggle with the management in the absence of clearly defined 
editorial policies according to ‘an-Nahar TV’ chairman Walid Moustafa:
 “The talk show host is responsible for what he is saying in his programme. It is 
very difficult to control him/her. On air, it is difficult for us to intervene. After 
the programme, we can discuss.”180
Hassan Rateb, the major owner of al-Mehwar TV network, has his own way 
of “controlling” the content of the popular political talk shows in his TV 
station. He knows how to choose a “loyal” media team:
 “I choose carefully my people, those who really care about our interests and 
that of the TV station. I have principles such as avoiding causing sectarian 
strife, or attacking the security forces…”181
178. Maged’s programme Baladna bil-Masri (Our Country in Egyptian) http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=3A83YCz8Hsg
179. Interview with author, March 2013. 
180. Ibid. 
181, Ibid.
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In the post-Morsi phase, prominent talk show hosts need no directives from 
their management. They are fully engaged in a unified voice that expresses 
loyalty to the new regime and attacks its opponents who are labelled as 
“terrorists,” “dangerous cells,” “gangs,” “mafia,” “anti-Islam,” “anti-Egyp- 
tians”182 etc. The impact of these talk show hosts on the political scene is to 
the extent of pressuring the government to take extreme repressive measures, 
expressing serious accusations and predicting crimes and assassinations. For 
instance, calls for labeling the Brotherhood as “terrorists” were orchestrated 
by several talk shows leading finally to a governmental decision declaring the 
group as “terrorist”. 183
According to Liliane Daoud, talk show host of ONTV, the political clubs are 
part of a mainstream media alignment with the new regime:
 “These talk shows are in tune with a general popular mood rejecting the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The fear of Islamists pushed people to a certain fascism, reflected 
in media as well. Some media figures are doing this out of fear from retaliation 
and others for sending a message to the military to express their loyalty…”184
Sherif Amer, the prominent talk show of al-Hayat TV station claims this 
reflects audience opinion:
 “The pressure on media moved from being exercised by the regime to being 
enforced by the society largely rejecting any representation of any Islamic voice. 
Every time I host a representative of an Islamic current in my programme, I 
receive extreme reactions such as we don’t want to see bears on TV.”185
182. See these YouTube videos in which talk show hosts express their emotions after the 
announcement of the removal of Morsi, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=55W1s
Ws_7us 
183. See YouTube video in which a talk show host urges the government to declare the 
Brotherhood a terrorist organization crying from the site of an explosion http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=nvBG1zbbfno
184. Interview with author, September 2013.
185. Ibid.
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He stresses that the “public mood” allows limited representation of dissenting 
voices, such as human rights activists, on media platforms. Radical critical 
voices are expressed narrowly and mostly from personalities who are outside 
the country hosted by these talk show platforms.
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Conclusion
Under the Mubarak regime, the rules of the game were clear. Media content, 
especially that of state media, was mostly unilateral reporting on the activi-
ties of the regime. The outbreak of private media introduced diversity; dissi-
dent voices were already represented, albeit with limitation, in private media 
platforms, especially during the later years of the regime. With the political 
divide infiltrating media post-January 25, this tabloid style was extended 
to diverse media outlets aligned with either liberals or Islamists. The trend 
deepened after the Brotherhood government was expelled, with sensation-
alism becoming populism. 
The post-January 25 Revolution phase created confusion in the media’s 
long-standing traditions. The erosion of the old status quo in the relation- 
ship between media and politics did not lead to the edification of new clear 
dynamics, thereby leaving the media to struggle with the shaky and complex 
dilemmas of the political transition. When asked about their ability to influ-
ence the new political sphere post-revolution, most editors interviewed 
stressed they were overwhelmed with the fast and complex developments of 
the political transition to the extent of being hostage to politics. 
However, the political alignment of the media elite in state and private media 
alike makes them unable and unwilling to define their role independently 
of political camps. The strong alignment, amplified following the military 
take- over, has transformed the role of media from a platform that contrasts 
views to a tool for delegitimising rivals, demonising them to the extent of 
portraying their physical eradication as a patriotic necessity.
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The long-standing traditions of self-censorship exercised by journalists are 
the most troublesome handicap for the media. Journalists are compliant with 
the political sphere, not only because of fear of retaliation but also because 
of a will to satisfy what they consider to be a “patriotic duty.” The conflicting 
relation between the Brotherhood government and private media reflects the 
rejection of the Islamic government considered by this media as non patriotic, 
rather than the regression of the self-censorship traditions among journalists. 
The first months post-revolution witnessed unprecedented journalistic 
courage to approach long-standing taboos, empowered by the environ-
ment of liberation brought about by the revolution. Consistent expressions 
of bravery—although in a chaotic manner—had a snowball effect which 
resulted in the challenging of some major established taboos, notably the 
sacred person of the President. The consistent criticism targeting Morsi from 
liberal media led to the fall of the reverential approach in dealing with the 
President, considered a sacred topic until very recently. The resurrection of 
self-censorship practices consolidating populist media trends represents a 
setback for the debate on reforming traditional national media. The media 
platforms which allow for a counter narrative are very limited and not able 
to challenge the dominant propagandist media discourse. Social media plat-
forms are again taking the lead in representing diverse voices beyond the 
official discourse.
The rebirth of a free and professional Egyptian media can only be an internal 
process enabled by journalists’ shift of identity from messenger to investigator 
of the political sphere. However, this identity change will not be realisti-
cally possible without an enabling legal and institutional environment. The 
post-revolution developments witnessed by Egyptian traditional media are 
linked to the history of the Egyptian media industry as well as the extraordi-
nary events of the political transition. Self-censorship habits are entrenched 
in the practices of Egyptian journalists with the pre-dominance of state 
media, a large employer for Egyptian journalists. For state media journalists, 
the perception of their role as servants of political masters did not change 
post-revolution, even though the debate on reforming state media was high 
on the agenda.
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Private media did not introduce a radical change on story- telling in depar-
ture from state media, although it managed to diversify its news sources and 
extend its coverage of the Egyptian streets. The subordination of these media 
outlets to the interests of their funders puts in question the notion of inde-
pendent media.
Post-revolution media reform was stalled by not only continuous political 
crises but also the lack of any meaningful reform of an extremely oppres-
sive regulatory framework. The new draft constitution guarantees important 
rights for journalists yet allowing their imprisonment and their trial before 
military courts for press offenses. The crackdown against the Muslim 
Brotherhood is accompanied by the revival of legal and institutional features 
of the police state, which threatens both the ideals of the revolution and 
democratic values. The regression of the vitality acquired by media platforms 
under the Brotherhood rule is associated with a general regression in rights 
and freedoms encouraged by a popular “mood” of sacrificing liberty in the 
name of national security.
The current strong resurrection of self-censorship practices reflected in a 
one-sided story orchestrated by a compliant media puts into question the 
future of media reform. The popularisation of such compliant media is 
not only hindering its ability to reform but also the entire democratisation 
process. It is therefore reasonable to state that a comprehensive media reform 
cannot not take place before the country’s return to a dynamic and pluralistic 
political process.
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Appendix
From the eruption of the January 25 Revolution to the date of the publica-
tion of this report, the Egyptian transition has witnessed the following major 
phases:
 Millions-strong demonstrations lead to the resignation of President 
Hosni Mubarak on 11 February 2011. After Mubarak steps down, 
the military takes over, dissolving parliament and suspending the 
constitution.
 The rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) witnesses 
violence and repression of protesters decrying military rule. An 
interim Constitution is proclaimed (23 March 2011).
 The parliamentary elections organised over a period of three months 
(November 2011–February 2012) lead to the victory of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, winning nearly half the seats of the lower house. Ultra 
conservative Salafis win another quarter of votes. In the upper house, 
Islamists win nearly 90 percent of the seats.
 The presidential elections see a high voter turnout (16/17 June 2012) 
and a fierce battle is fought between the top two candidates in the 
electoral runoff: the Brotherhood’s Morsi and Ahmed Shafiq, the last 
prime minister under Mubarak. Morsi wins the elections with 51.7 
percent of the vote.
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 President Morsi issues a constitutional declaration granting himself 
far-reaching powers. The declaration (22 November 2012)186 gives 
his decisions immunity from judicial review and bars the courts from 
dissolving the constituent assembly and the upper house of parlia-
ment. The move sparks large popular dissent.
 Although members of liberal parties and representatives of Egypt’s 
churches withdrew from the assembly, the new constitution drafted 
by a largely Islamic assembly is approved in a two-round referendum 
(63.8 percent votes in favour).
 Millions of Egyptians demonstrate on Morsi’s first anniversary in 
office, calling on him to step down (30 June 2013) and accusing him 
of inefficiency and abuse of power.
 General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt’s military chief, announces the 
ousting of Morsi (3 July 2013) in a popularly backed military coup. 
Supreme Constitutional Court Chief Justice Adly Mansour is sworn 
in as Egypt’s interim President. Mansour dissolves the Islamist- domi-
nated upper house of parliament as Morsi’s supporters stage mass 
protests demanding his return.
 Gen. Sisi calls for Egyptians to give him a mandate to combat the 
so-called “terrorism” threat. 
 Security forces crush two pro-Morsi protest camps in Cairo, killing 
nearly 1,000 people (14 August 2013). Thousands of Brotherhood 
members are arrested in a widening crackdown on the group. The 
move causes days of nationwide violence that also leads to attacks 
against churches and governmental sites. The crackdown of the 
camps is described by Human Rights Watch as the most serious inci-
dent of mass killing in the modern history of Egypt.187
. Ahram Online, “Egypt’s President Morsi expands power, defies judiciary with new decla- 
ration,” 22 November 2012, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/58936/ 
Egypt/Politics-/Egypts-President-Morsi-expands-power,-defies-judic.aspx
187. HumanRightsWatch,“Egypt:Securityforcesusedexcessivelethalforce,”19August2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/08/19/egypt-security-forces-used-excessive-lethal-force
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 Morsi is facing trial along with top Brotherhood leaders accused of 
inciting violence.188 
 A 50-member panel is formed to draft a new constitution for the 
country; the 2012 constitution is withdrawn. The new draft consti-
tution strengthens the army’s power and allows civilians’ prosecution 
before military courts. The constitution has been voted in a national 
referendum in 14 and 15 January 2014.189 
 A new protest law restricting demonstrations sparks large outcry. 
Human rights groups have condemned the law as a major blow to 
freedom in Egypt.190
 The Egyptian government declares the Muslim Brotherhood a 
terrorist group after blaming it for series of attacks against security 
HQ. (25 December 2013).191
 Freedom of expression is threatened by a series of coercive measures 
including arbitrary closure of TV stations and journalists’ arrests. 
Systematic pressure is exercised on local and foreign journalists 
“displaying clear hostility towards media that fail to sing the army’s 
praises” according to Reporters without Borders.192
188. J. Fleishman, “Mohamed Morsi to stand trial in deaths of Egyptian protesters,” Los 
Angeles Times, http://www.latimes.com/world/worldnow/la-fg-wn-mohamed-morsi-trial-
20130901,0,7433266.story#axzz2ozqxqyJe
189. BBC, “Egypt referendum: ‘98% back new constitution,” 19 January 2014, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25796110
190. Al-Jazeera, “Egyptians on streets to defy new protest law” http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
middleeast/2013/11/egyptians-streets-defy-new-protest-law-20131129145449383814.
html
191. BBC, “Egypt Muslim Brotherhood declared “terrorist group” 25 December 2013, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25515932
192. Reporters Without Borders, “Freedom of information falls prey to military crackdown,” 
25  September  2013  http://en.rsf.org/egypt-freedom-of-information-falls-prey-25-09- 
2013,45234.html
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